

mittee which sought to prove that some of the personnel of the stations had so-called "subversive" backgrounds (see "Pacifica and the FCC: Dangerous Precedent" by Laurent B. Frantz, *The Nation*, November 30, 1963), the FCC renewed the licenses by unanimous decision. Without conducting a full-dress investigation, the commission made sufficient inquiry to satisfy itself that the charges were not well founded. More important, however, is the broad sweep of the decision in support of the stations' right to present programs that were not "wholly inoffensive or bland," that might well offend some listeners. As long as a station does not consistently, over a period of time, pursue a type of programming inconsistent with the public interest, the commission is unwilling to substitute its judgment for that of the licensee. Under the circumstances, the decision reflects political courage and eminent good sense. It should encourage other stations to engage in more "controversial" broadcasting.

## Glenn in Orbit

When John Glenn returned from outer space in February, 1962, he promptly announced, "I have no political ambitions, none whatsoever." Now, having thrown his hat into the Senatorial ring, he explains that he decided to run because "this is an area in which I have had a lifelong interest. I feel that it provides the best opportunity to make use of the experience I have gained in twenty-two years of government service." All this is in the American tradition of political coquetry, not altogether remote from Byron's line about the girl who, "vowing she would ne'er consent, consented."

Equally nonsensical is the reason Colonel Glenn gives for his consent. His experience has been as a flier, a marine and a spaceman; none of it has a direct bearing on the problems of running the country. As for background, Glenn knows far less about space science and technology than dozens of NASA administrators and engineers whose names never reach the public, and who will never find themselves in the tip of a rocket.

Politically irrelevant people have made a success of politics from time to time, and Glenn should not be damned out of hand. A special objection, however, springs from the origins of his fame. The astronauts were type-cast by NASA and the services: all were good test pilots with some engineer training, all were splendid physical specimens and clean-cut American types. All were conventional in their backgrounds, their marriages and their views. It is as if they had been selected for the image of orthodoxy they would project before the public.

So screened, and ruling out the improbable flowering of latent political perspicuity and independence, Glenn cannot be expected to offer much in the way of courageous and original thinking in a period when the country faces the most dangerous dilemmas at home and abroad. In the Democratic primary, moreover, he faces Stephen M. Young who, despite his seventy-four years, is one of the most spirited and progressive members of the Senate. Can anyone imagine Glenn telling off a big shot in the American Legion in the tone of the "Listen, Buster" letter? From this national standpoint, Robert Kennedy would have done better not to plant or water the seed of Glenn's candidacy; and whether it will improve Democratic chances in Ohio remains to be seen.

## SUKARNO: Regional Bully . . . . . Bruce Grant

Indonesia's decision to "confront" its new neighbor, Malaysia, has opened eyes to the real dangers in Jakarta's understanding of its role in Southeast Asia. Once regarded as one of the unluckiest of possessions in its choice of colonizer, later seen as a leader of the morally influential non-aligned group of nations, Indonesia is now quickly gaining a reputation as a regional bully.

When Malaysia came into being on September 16, 1963, it offered no threat to Indonesia. Its defense

arrangements with Britain and its Commonwealth neighbors, Australia and New Zealand, were essentially the same as had existed with Malaya since it became independent in 1957. The "will of the people" had shown itself to two commissions of inquiry, as well as in two elections and one referendum, to favor the new confederation. The investigating team sent by the United Nations Secretary General (U Thant) confirmed this impression and gave Malaysia a clean bill of health. Yet Indonesia has claimed that the new nation is a threat to her security and that, contrary to appearances, the will of the people opposes it. In the hope of proving this point, it has launched an offensive against its northern neighbor which involves


the full range of unpleasantness short of an open declaration of war. Amid jubilant predictions by President Sukarno that "we will crunch up Malaysia and spit out the pieces," Indonesia has banned trade with Malaysia — a blow at Singapore's entrepôt business — and is training and equipping guerrilla bands for subversion along its 900-mile border with Malaysia in Kalimantan (Borneo).

Since it was first floated as an idea in May of 1961 by Tunku Abdul Rahman, then Prime Minister of Malaya, the proposed federation of Malaysia has had its critics. This was not surprising, as the proposal intended to bring together five units in different stages of development: an independent nation

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February 3, 1964



(Malaya), a self-governing state (Singapore), two British colonies (Sarawak and Sabah) and a British protectorate (Brunei), which subsequently held out. Many of its 10 million people were uncertain about the change. Local politicians, who did not fancy the larger arena, local commercial interests and racial groups, whose traditional advantages were in some way challenged, fed the uncertainty. But public-opinion tests showed that, whatever the precise percentage, an evident majority favored the move. Only the Communists remained consistently opposed.

The Indonesian Communist party (PKI) clearly stated its opposition to Malaysia — in line with the international Communist view that Malaysia was a British neo-colonialist plot — at a conference on December 30-31, 1961. But a month before (on November 20), the Indonesian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Dr. Subandrio, made the following statement to the UN General Assembly: "We are not only disclaiming the territories outside the former Netherlands East Indies, although they are of the same island, but — more than that — when Malaya told us of her intention to merge with the three British Crown Colonies of Sarawak, Brunei

[sic] and British North Borneo [Sabah] as one federation, we told them that we have no objections and that we wish them success with this merger so that everyone may live in peace and freedom." This permissive attitude continued through 1962 — when, perhaps significantly, the negotiations with the Dutch over West Irian (Indonesia's name for West New Guinea) were going on. As late as September, Dr. Subandrio in written answers to questions from the *Sydney Morning Herald* said Malaysia was "up to the people of those countries themselves."

Why did the Indonesian Government change position on Malaysia? The expert opinions on this intriguing subject vary a great deal. Some say that the Minister for Defense, General Nasution, is eager to keep up his army strength, as a counter to the growing influence of the PKI, and is prepared to generate a crisis atmosphere to justify his army of 500,000. Others say that, as Sukarno had finally agreed to American pressures for economic reforms (which were introduced in May, 1963), he was forced to demonstrate that he was still anti-imperialist by taking the PKI line on Malaysia. It is also pointed out that

Indonesia's economic position had already deteriorated so far that any attempt at reform is likely to fail — a failure to be justified only by reference to an enemy outside.

Other experts point to shifts in the internal balance of power supporting Sukarno. Some believe that diplomacy — of the kind that brought about the *Maphilindo* meetings of Malaya, the Philippines and Indonesia in Manila — would have succeeded had not the British decided to bustle Indonesia. There is a view that Britain, knowing that Australia wanted, if possible, to retain a foot in both the Indonesian and Malaysian camps, forced the issue to insure an Australian commitment as an additional lever on Washington.

Any or all of these explanations may be pertinent. Indonesian politics, like those of most nations, are capable of varied and even mutually exclusive interpretations. But most informed opinion on Indonesia assumes that Sukarno is something of a captive leader, that he is precariously and cleverly balanced on the locked shoulders of the rival contenders for power, principally the army and the Communists.

Yet there is evidence that Sukarno has increased his real power considerably since 1957, when he introduced "guided democracy." He is not a dictator in the European sense, with a loyal party to force his leadership on the nation. He is not cruel and, although his petty pleasures sometimes show the personality of a tyrant, he can also be forgiving — witness the "return to the fold of the republic" of the army colonels and political economists who led the costly rebellion of 1958-61. But since the *Masjumi* (moderate Muslim party) and the PSI (Socialist party) were banned in 1960, the check on the president's legally unlimited power has lessened. Increasingly surrounded by like-minded men, Sukarno is able to use Indonesia's traditional forms of democracy (such as *musjawarah*, meaning discussion, and *mufakat*, meaning the consensus of the meeting) as instruments by which to shape public opinion rather than be shaped by it. Guided democracy pays lip service to the principles of popular rule, but it lacks the safeguards: the people cannot change the government peacefully and they

have no independent judiciary to protect them from official displeasure.

At the UN General Assembly in 1960, Sukarno unveiled his theory of the "new emerging forces." In the three years since then, it has become both more sophisticated and more emphatic, producing its *coup de théâtre* in November, 1963, when the first Games of the New Emerging Forces (GANEFU) were held in Jakarta. Fifty-one countries were represented, although some of them by little more than a flag. Sukarno's "new emerging" and "old established" forces have not received much serious attention from political analysts, on the reliable assumption that the theory is window dressing for the Indonesian revolution that, much to the Communists' annoyance, has never taken place. But the theory represents a development in the president's thinking that seems to be relevant to Indonesia's current foreign policies.

In 1955, when Indonesia was host to the Afro-Asian countries at the Bandung Conference, Sukarno gave a welcoming speech in which he stated Indonesia's view of non-alignment in the traditional neutralist form of a rational brake on the power-mad, nuclear-clad blocs.

*What can we do? The peoples of Asia and Africa wield little physical power. Even their economic strength is dispersed and slight. We cannot indulge in power politics. Diplomacy is not for us a matter of the big stick. What can we do? We can do much. We can inject the voice of reason into world affairs. . . .*

Nine years later this "three world" theory has changed. The "new emerging" forces, representing three-quarters of the world, are ranged against the "old established" forces, representing the other quarter. They are engaged in a death struggle which, because "one cannot escape history," will lead to the destruction of the "old" and the establishment of a "new" society. The new emerging forces are "the Asian nations, the African nations, the Latin American nations, the nations of the Socialist [meaning Communist] countries, the progressive groups in the capitalist countries . . . at least two thousand million people on the earth!" The old established forces (sometimes called "powers" or "order") has not been defined, except by elimination, but

it obviously represents the bulk of the Western world.

This swing to a revolutionary, "two world" concept of Indonesia's international role (naturally she will lead the new emerging forces) places Indonesia in alignment with the Communist bloc against the West. The theory does not describe a recognizable international reality; the world has not taken Sukarno's theory to heart and divided accordingly. Even in Indonesia, where the propaganda of three years is having an effect, it is freely recognized that Sukarno is not describing reality; he is concocting an ideology to which all his supporters can subscribe.

He has been successful to the degree that both the army and the PKI, as well as the Nationalists, the National-Communists (Partai Murba) and the various religious groups, use "new emerging" and "old established" forces to explain and justify themselves these days. Dr. Subandrio, who used to accept the old-fashioned East-West world division, hardly speaks today without a passionate reference to the clash between the 75 per cent and the 25 per cent.

Sukarno's theorizing has been supported by General Nasution's obvious loyalty since 1958, and by the development of "Konfrontasi" as a technique of power politics. For

in confronting the old established forces, Indonesia is confronting its region. Its three neighbors, Australia, Malaysia and the Philippines, are all committed to Western defensive and ideological positions of one kind or another. Britain and America have bases in the area and their fleets roam the seas of Southeast Asia.

Confrontation worked well over West Irian, because neither the far-away Dutch nor the nearby Australians wanted to fight. There was a sense that the real failure of Western policy was not the American diplomatic initiative which finally brought the two sides together but the fact that this was delayed until Indonesia had created a military threat, with arms from the Communist bloc worth \$1 billion. Indonesia now has the biggest navy in Southeast Asia and the most sophisticated air force. Australia and Malaysia are both rearming, but the presence of Britain (with implicit or explicit American support) is still necessary to maintain a balance. In deciding to confront Malaysia, Indonesia was in effect determining to chase the British from Southeast Asia as she had chased the Dutch.

Confrontation is a two-fisted stance, military and political, by which it is hoped to scare or disorganize the opponent into submis-



Batik Design: Java

sion without actually coming to blows. Over West Irian it was concentrated on the Dutch and in the physical region of eastern Indonesia. For Malaysia, confrontation requires a broader stance if it is to cover the traditional trade (and widespread smuggling), land, sea and air relations with both Malaysia and Australia (which now has a 500-mile land border with Indonesia in New Guinea), and the effective presence of Britain and America. So far, it has been concentrated on Britain, the line being that the ordinary people of Malaysia are innocent victims of British imperialism and its Tshombe-like stooge, Tunku Abdul Rahman. In a speech in February, 1963, entitled "We Are Being Encircled," Sukarno developed this theme in an obvious direction: "Malaysia is to protect the safety of tin for the imperialists, Malaysia is to protect rubber for the imperialists, Malaysia is to protect oil for the imperialists."

Early in 1963, Australia was

anxious to avoid a showdown with Indonesia and was prepared to accept its "right" to be consulted over the disposal of territory on its border. The Maphilindo meetings were arranged and, after several alarms, concluded with the summit conference of the Tunku, Sukarno and the president of the Philippines (Mr. Macapagal) in August. But despite this recognition, which in the opinion of some observers gave Indonesia long-term advantages in establishing itself as the first power in the region, the Jakarta leadership embarked on the hazardous drama of "crushing" Malaysia. Whatever doubts lingered in Canberra were removed. The Menzies government solemnly gave a promise of military support to Malaysia and, in a suddenly called election, prior to which it went out of its way to ask for public support for its defense and foreign policies in Southeast Asia, was returned with a larger majority than it had expected.

There is every indication that

events are reaching the point where Indonesia will have to modify its opposition to Malaysia (especially its military assistance to border subversion), or be prepared to face a more conventional test of strength. Indonesia has for so long neglected rational policies, preferring to base its bid for recognition on status symbols enforced by what has been called "Pavlov diplomacy" (enticements alternating with harsh and inexplicable punishments), that there is real danger that such a challenge would be accepted. As the economy declines still more, the pressure on the leaders to create tests of their gallantry becomes almost irresistible. As Sukarno grows older and Indonesia's economic welfare stagnates and even declines, it becomes evident that he cannot expect to lead his people—as Tunku Abdul Rahman can—toward prosperity. But his place in history as a revolutionary is assured and he apparently proposes to play this role until the end of his life.

## TUSSLE in TEXAS . . . . . Saul Friedman

*Houston*

Late last October, Southern Methodist University in Dallas published *The Decision-Makers*, a penetrating, sociological study of the close-knit power structure that for years has ruled Dallas in its image. "The city," wrote author Carol Estes Thometz, "would suffer if such power were concentrated in the hands of men who would use it unwisely." At least one member of the Dallas power structure, Stanley Marcus, president of the Neiman-Marcus store, now believes that wisdom was lacking. For on November 22, and in the days since, the city suffered.

Yet little has changed in Dallas. If anything, the murder of President Kennedy has strengthened the decision makers—the men who built their city into a bastion of rigid conservatism, and who have tolerated, when they did not actively support, the rabid Right as a means of frightening moderate and liberal dissenters into silence.

The *Dallas Morning News*,

spokesman for the power structure and the hard Right, says that J. Erik Jonsson, who has been at the top of Miss Thometz's power pyramid, has agreed to become mayor should the incumbent Earle Cabell resign to run against ultra-conservative Rep. Bruce Alger. And Robert Morris, long a right-wing leader, enjoys strong Dallas support in his race for the Republican senatorial nomination against a moderate conservative, George Bush of Houston.

Dallas, the home of billionaire H. L. Hunt and former General Edwin Walker, continues to be a mecca for speakers like the Reverend Billy James Hargis, John Birch Society leader John Rousselot, and former Major Arch Roberts, the one-time aide to Walker and author of his "pro-Blue" troop indoctrination course. Roberts, in town to pay his respects to his former chief, and to speak before the Minute Women and Hunt-supported Pro-America, charged that traitors (he included Dean Acheson and Philip Jessup) had created the United Nations, that it was now Communist-dominated and that American soldiers are be-

ing brainwashed by civilian meddlers to prepare them to fight under a UN Soviet commander.

Hunt's "Life-lines" is still on the air, and Birch Society meetings grow larger.

In Dallas and elsewhere in Texas, the extreme Right seems to be regrouping along the line recently promulgated in advertisements and intra-organization bulletins by the Birch Society. It goes like this: There is no reason for Dallas, or Texas, or conservatives, or the nation to do any post-assassination soul searching. President Kennedy was not their victim—he was killed by the international Communist conspiracy.

A letter received by the *Houston Chronicle* from a woman reader vividly sums up the point of view:

*A display of hatred has not always been considered so terrible. . . . Even Christ showed anger and hatred.*

*Now I do not presume to compare the attitude of the people of Dallas with Christ, but I simply wish to remind those individuals who have*

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