CAAT Publications - Arms Exports to Indonesia

Arms Exports to Indonesia

Written by Nicholas Gilby, © October 1999

Section II: UK EXPORTS AND POLICY

Section III: OTHER EXPORTING COUNTRIES

Conclusion

Notes

Acronyms

Since the mid-1970s the international community, in particular the West, has supplied large amounts of military equipment to Indonesia. This is despite the regime's denial of human rights in Indonesia during the past three decades, and its brutal invasion and occupation of the former Portuguese colony of East Timor in 1975.

The Labour government came to power in the UK pledging not to "permit the sale of arms to regimes that might use them for internal repression or international aggression," and to "spread the values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy which we demand for ourselves". The refusal of Labour to rescind arms exports licences to Indonesia, granted under the Conservatives, figures showing the number of arms export licences issued with respect to Indonesia, and Labour's admission that equipment exported has been used by Indonesia for internal security have brought the sincerity of Labour's policy into question. This briefing examines the Labour government's record on arms to Indonesia against its stated "ethical" objectives, particularly in the light of Indonesia's recent human rights record. Many other countries continue to export arms to Indonesia, and the arms trade to Indonesia is considered here in a broader international context.

Indonesia has undergone major changes since the end of 1996, the outcome of which are unclear. The four main events have been the fall of former President Suharto, the economic crisis (part of a wider economic malaise in South-east Asia), the recent Indonesian general and presidential elections, and the referendum on the future of East Timor and its aftermath. Suharto, an authoritarian right-wing dictator who had ruled Indonesia since 1965, was forced to resign in May 1998, his legitimacy destroyed in the eyes of sections of the ruling elite as well as the wider populace. Dr Habibie, his replacement, who had previously headed the military-industrial complex, presides over a regime that has made a few important changes. The widespread unrest during 1998 put great pressure on the Indonesian elite to liberalise, demonstrated in the decision to agree to a United Nations (UN)-supervised referendum over the future of East Timor. However, the military proceeded to arm pro-Indonesian militias with the intention of destabilising the referendum by terrorising the population. Having forced the UN to delay the referendum for several weeks because of worries over security, the refusal of the army and pro-Indonesian militias to accept the overwhelming vote in favour of independence resulted in the worst violence in East Timor for many years. The militias, abetted by the Indonesian military, carried out many atrocities against independence supporters, reducing East Timor to a state of anarchy, killing thousands and displacing the majority of the population from their homes. At present, the regime is still repressive, influenced by the military, and continues to commit atrocities in East Timor and Indonesia, as this briefing shows. This briefing looks at how far the changes and unrest in Indonesia may affect the arms trade in the future.

Until very recently, i.e. after Suharto's demise, the electoral system in Indonesia guaranteed victory to GOLKAR, the ruling party. GOLKAR was the only political party in Indonesia that was backed financially by local and national government, the civil servants organisation Korpri and the Ministry of Information. It was the only party allowed to campaign below district level. All of the three parties, GOLKAR, Muslim and PDI (Christian nationalist), were required to support the government programme and Pancasila (the state ideology). The upper house had a built-in government majority (as half were Presidential appointees and most of the rest inevitably from GOLKAR), and elected the Vice-President and President. All electoral candidates were screened by military intelligence (for the 1997 General Election 257 out of 2293 candidates were failed¹ i.e. 11.2%), to ensure GOLKAR's political hegemony. Furthermore, during elections campaigning material was censored and permission was needed to hold public meetings. No rallies were allowed.² The government actively intimidated political opposition, such as PDI leader, Megawati Sukarnoputri. After the Indonesian regime had organised her ousting as PDI leader, it raided the PDI headquarters sparking violent rioting in Jakarta in July 1996.³

Nevertheless, under pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to curtail the extent of cronyism in Indonesian politics plus the mounting unrest, the new President Dr Habibie liberalised the system. There is now no restriction on the number of parties permitted to contest elections, and the number of military seats in the Indonesian lower house was cut from 75 to 38 out of 500. The upper house now includes all 500 lower house representatives, plus 135 provincial delegates and 65 from various "social institutions". The President can only remain in office for a maximum of two five-year terms. Freedom of expression during elections was granted. However, the military is still guaranteed seats at provincial, district and lower house level.

The military plays a hugely important role in Indonesian politics. Suharto (premier from 1965 to 1998) was himself an army general. The armed forces - ABRI (now called TNI after the police separated from the armed forces on 1st April 1999), has always had a dual function role ("dwi fungsi"), which is involvement in the political and social running of the state, and also to guard against external threats as well as internal dissent. Until recently the military could screen candidates for the "democratic" elections and the armed forces (ABRI) were allocated 75 seats, out of the 500 in the Indonesian lower house. Previously, the post of adjutant to Suharto has been a typical route to high command for young officers (e.g. General Wiranto, current TNI Commander-in-Chief). Currently the Ministries of Home Affairs, Defence and Information are held by military officers. The military could potentially hold more senior government posts after the October Presidential elections. At a meeting of the Indonesian Parliament on 21st September 1999, Akbar Tandjung, leader of GOLKAR, said he would recommend General Wiranto as the party's Vice-Presidential candidate, saying of Wiranto and Dr Habibie "they have co-operated well for a long time and, seen from other perspectives, such as relations between ... civilians and the military, they make a good pair".⁴ However, General Wiranto declined the invitation to be GOLKAR's Vice-Presidential candidate on 18th October 1999, two days before the election.⁵ The police, who played a political role in suppressing opposition to the government in the Suharto era were under ABRI control. Many administrative positions in rural areas are held by military officers, giving the government social control in the countryside.⁶ Recently the TNI decided to slash this layer of administration, forcing some 3000 active officers to choose between remaining in the TNI or the civilian administration. The extent to which this layer has maintained control in rural areas is suggested by the fact that preliminary election results show that most of GOLKAR's voters live in rural and remote areas.⁷

The economic interests of the most politically powerful in Indonesian society are vast. The Suharto family fortune has been estimated as US$15 billion.⁸ Profits from inward investments to the regime's supporters are substantial. Suharto's children made fortunes through monopolies in the distribution and importation of major commodities, and evading taxes. Suharto's eldest son was to receive 20% of the profits of a Thames Water deal worth £225 million, and 9% of the profits of a BP deal with P.T.Peni.⁹ Likewise, the Trafalgar House Construction company's venture in Indonesia was linked to Suharto's eldest daughter.¹⁰ Within Indonesia, the six Suharto children hold significant equity in at least 564 companies, and hundreds of firms overseas.¹¹ The Indonesian occupation of East Timor generated vast profits for top generals as they took control of the Timorese economy,¹² and the Suharto family on its own or through corporate entities controls nearly 40% of the province of East Timor.¹³ A recent World Bank internal document revealed the corruption which has led to the embezzling of vast loans meant for Indonesian development since 1967. One third of the loans, worth US$24 billion, intended for infrastructure projects connected to Suharto's family members, relatives, and business cronies disappeared into their pockets.¹⁴

Suharto's replacement, Dr Habibie, also had considerable economic interests promoted by the regime's policies (his family runs dozens of companies). For twenty-one years Dr Habibie has run IPTN (chaired by Suharto), the Indonesian aircraft manufacturer. Dr Habibie's company has greatly profited from his proximity to the centre of power and thus ABRI. In June 1997 it won the Indonesian air force contract for 16 NAS-332 Super Pumas, 10 NC-212 Aviocars, and the refurbishment of 11 SA 330 Puma helicopters.¹⁵ However, as a result of being seen as corrupt and erratic by the West, the IMF bailout conditions for Indonesia included the end of state funding of IPTN, although Suharto announced "private funding" would be used instead.¹⁶ This did not seem to affect its success – in April 1998 it had a healthy order book, with orders from Brunei, South Korea, Thailand and Malaysia.¹⁷ However, the severity of the economic problems caused the IPTN Chief Executive Hari Laksano to announce in February 1999 that the Indonesian military had cancelled all their contracts apart from the helicopter order for the Indonesian Navy due to lack of funds, although IPTN's export orders will be completed.¹⁸ Nevertheless, the order for the NAS-332 Super Pumas appears to be going ahead, although they will be delivered over a longer period than originally planned.¹⁹

Although Suharto's interests were being dismantled after his demise, the regime and its supporters have considerable personal interest in seeing inward investment continue (in May 1998 the UK had £3.4 billion invested in 31 projects²⁰). Likewise, UK companies have considerable interest in supporting the current regime given the privileged access they enjoy to a regime which will not only buy weapons from them to protect their investments in the region (e.g. Natuna) but will keep labour costs low by denying labour and human rights to ordinary Indonesians. UK companies take the view, as evidently do George Robertson, then Defence Secretary and Sir Ken Jackson of the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union (AEEU), that it is commercially important for the UK not to upset Indonesia over arms. This is despite Ali Alatas, the Indonesian Foreign Minister saying in June 1997 that Indonesia would continue civil trade with Britain even if arms trading were restricted (the UK was at the time the second-largest foreign investor in Indonesia).²¹ In addition to this, the West and the UK in particular is heavily exposed financially in Indonesia. Indonesia at the end of 1998 owed Western banks £30.75 billion. UK banks HSBC, Standard Chartered, Schroders, NatWest and Barclays are large lenders to Indonesian companies. Indonesia also currently owes the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) £12.75 billion, and £13.5 billion to Western governments.²² The West thus has considerable interest in preserving Indonesian military strength to ensure Indonesian political security to guarantee their credit is repaid.

From early July 1997, the forces of global capital wreaked destruction on Indonesia, causing an abrupt end to the rapid economic development of Indonesia. Between early July 1997 and late January 1998 the rupiah lost 85% of its value against the US dollar and the Indonesian stock exchange index lost 50% of its value,²³ with inflation soaring to over 50%. Industrial development was abruptly stymied with 80 projects, including an airport, abandoned by January 1998²⁴ and the collapse of the US$2 million IPTN project to build a 130-seater jet, with which UK companies Lucas-Varity and GEC-Marconi were involved.²⁵ Output in 1998 declined by 16%.²⁶ Overnight Indonesia became a heavily indebted nation. Estimates put non-performing loans from domestic banks at more than 30% of GDP in Indonesia. To this must be added an overhang of unpayable external debt, estimated at US$22 billion.²⁷ Explanations of the problems have focused on either "crony capitalism", the increase in dissent and the regime's increasing difficulty in maintaining social conditions which had been conducive to rapid growth, or the destabilising effects of short-term capital inflows (in January 1998 US$40 billion of Indonesia's US$65 billion private sector debt was short-term²⁸). The consequences of this crisis were severe and the burden placed on Indonesia's most vulnerable. Since mid-1997, Indonesia's annual per capita income has plunged from US$1200 to US$400.²⁹ In 1996 some 4.5 million people were already unemployed, but due to the effects of the crisis, official estimates suggest an additional ten million had lost their jobs by early 1999. Droughts and food shortages became common especially in rural areas, and inflation coupled with government spending cuts created considerable hardship. Absolute poverty which had been declining since 1966 was on the increase; at the end of 1998 the number of people living under the poverty line had risen to 118.5 million from 22.5 million (or from 11.2% of the population to 60.6%).³⁰ To date, the crisis is still severe and shows little sign of abating.

Initial attempts to mitigate the crisis failed. The IMF bailed out Indonesia to the tune of US$43 billion, insisting on a stringent programme of economic reforms such as cutting government food and fuel subsidies, causing further unrest. In May 1998 the IMF had to modify its terms to take account of Indonesia's political and social fragility. Despite this, the IMF has an effective veto over Indonesia's economic policy. The IMF's First Deputy Managing Director Stanley Fischer recently warned Dr Habibie and the five main parties in Indonesia that any major departure from the IMF programme could slow release of the bail-out money.³¹ This warning seems to have been taken seriously; one of Megawati Sukarnoputri's economic advisers, Laksamana Sukardi said "we will not depart from the IMF programme because we don't have a choice".³² Whilst this is the case, the chances of any significant recovery in Indonesia's economic fortunes in the near future must be small.

The effect of this on arms sales to Indonesia has been twofold. Indonesia has little indigenous military industry and thus needs to import almost all of its weaponry. Currency depreciation plus IMF imposed budget cuts have reduced its ability to do so. This is particularly apparent considering that total Indonesian imports from the UK fell by 50.3% in the first quarter of 1998.³³

The Indonesian military budget has been severely cut as a result of the crisis, but most of the reduction in expenditure can probably be explained by the arms imports moratorium rather than a significant cut in either manpower or combat readiness. In 1996 Indonesia spent US$4.7 billion on their military, in 1997 US$4.8 billion, and was projected to spend US$1.7 billion in 1998. The rupiah figures show an increase in spending from Rp11 trillion in 1996 to Rp20 trillion in 1998, suggesting the change in spending will almost exclusively focus on imports.³⁴ Although there has been a moratorium on arms purchases, five Indonesian private companies have been illegally importing hundreds of firearms, gas and electric shock weapons, according to the Chief Spokesman of the State Police Headquarters.³⁵

Unsurprisingly, given its built-in superiority in the Indonesian polity, GOLKAR won the General Election in 1997, achieving a record 74% of the vote.³⁶ Soon afterwards Suharto tightened his grip by reshuffling the ABRI high command to promote officers all recognised as being close to him. The Army Chief of Staff General Raden Hartano became Minister of Information, his former post being occupied by General Wiranto (former commanding officer of KOSTRAD – the Indonesian Army strategic reserve). The new KOSTRAD C.O. was General Sugiano, the former C.O. of the Presidential Security Unit. In February 1998 General Wiranto became ABRI Commander-in-Chief, whilst command of KOSTRAD was given to General Prabowo (Suharto's son-in-law), who became Indonesia's youngest three-star general aged 48.³⁷

In March 1998 the Indonesian upper house elected Suharto President for a seventh term and elected Dr Habibie as Vice-President. Despite Suharto's tightening of his power by favourable promotions and shielding the military from drastic cuts, he resigned from office on May 21st 1998, the end of a 33-year term of office. This was a result of Suharto's inability to contain the economic crisis which began in August 1997 and the consequent deepening unrest in Indonesia. This destroyed any legitimacy his rule had gained through Indonesia's rapid economic growth, which had, in any case, been distributed extremely unevenly, with vastly disproportionate gains made by the Jakarta-based elite. His cronyism was criticised by the thousands, largely students, who protested against him. This, and his age and length of tenure in office were factors leading to the speaker of Parliament, GOLKAR and the leader of the Muhamaddiyah movement (one of the biggest Islamic groups) calling on him to resign. It is important to be clear his ousting was not as a result of any democratic process, and although popular pressure played some part, it did not do so through any democratic political process.

Despite being seen by Western investors as interventionist and erratic on economics, Dr Habibie was immediately endorsed by General Wiranto and ABRI.³⁸ Whatever Indonesia's economic problems, in high politics, military backing is still the crucial determinant of a candidate's prospects for high office. Dr Habibie repaid General Wiranto's faith in him by appointing him Defence Minister in the new Cabinet announced in July 1998, as well as letting him retain his military Office. At the time General Wiranto was seen as more moderate than many of his military peers.³⁹ The crucial posts (given the nature of the regime) of Home Affairs and Information were also given to military officers.⁴⁰

Dr Habibie's government, under enormous domestic, economic and political pressure, decided to try to liberalise the regime. He announced a democratic general election for 7th June 1999, with the elections for President and Vice-President in the autumn of 1999. The process was assisted by large aid contributions from Australia, Japan and the European Union (EU) and US$50 million from the UN Development Fund. Forty-eight parties contested the elections. He also started negotiations over the future of East Timor. Indonesia and Portugal (the former colonial power) agreed on a plebiscite for East Timor, where its citizens had to choose between autonomy under Indonesian rule or full independence. However, UN Secretary-General Kofi Anan delayed the plebiscite for three weeks, citing security and logistical problems. The referendum eventually took place on 30th August 1999, having been originally scheduled for 8th August and then postponed until 21st August. As part of the liberalisation of Indonesia, Dr Habibie released political prisoners, although he took a gradual approach. In August 1998, 27 were freed, followed by 43 on 31st December 1998.⁴¹ Jose "Xanana" Gusmao, the East Timorese resistance leader, was freed on 7th September 1999 in the wake of fears for his safety in Indonesian custody, following the referendum result42 . Dr Habibie also cut military representation in government and downplayed the army's future role, claiming it should "not always [be] in the frontline of society"43 , although, since then, General Wiranto has called for a stronger military, saying "if democracy is strong but the law is weak, this country will become a wild place".⁴⁴

Megawati Sukarnoputri, seen as the leading contender in the Presidential elections (her party, PDI Perjuangan, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle, had 153 seats and 34% of the vote after the general election, making it the largest party), did not seem to promise much improvement. Much of her support was due to her opposition to Suharto (which may have been motivated mainly by Suharto's overthrowing of her father in 1965), however, she had good links with the military and commanded support amongst many retired military officers. She favoured Indonesia being a unitary state and was opposed to independence in East Timor. Her party also rejected calls to eliminate the military's dual function in society, which has contributed to much of the human rights abuses in Indonesia.⁴⁵

Dr Habibie, however, was still tipped by many to be re-elected as President. There were rumours that GOLKAR were trying to ensure his re-election by buying votes.⁴⁶ A report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers into the Indonesian banking system found that $70million of the IMF's $43 billion bail-out package found its way into 100 bank accounts via a GOLKAR-linked company. The report found "numerous indicators of fraud ... undue preferential treatment, concealment, bribery and corruption".⁴⁷ The leader of GOLKAR, Akbar Tandjung, nominated General Wiranto as the party's Vice-Presidential candidate. However, against expectations, General Wiranto belatedly withdrew on 18th October 1999, shortly before Dr Habibie's performance report was rejected in the upper house by 355 votes to 322. All 11 political factions then announced they accepted the East Timorese vote for independence.⁴⁸ Subsequently, Dr Habibie pulled out of the Presidential election.

The leader of the National Awakening Party (PKB), Abdurrachman Wahid, having suddenly withdrawn his party's support from Megawati, was elected President on 20th October 1999 by 373 votes to 313 over Megawati. Wahid, or Gus Dur as he is also known, is linked to the Suharto family (having campaigned with Suharto's daughter in the 1997 elections) and has reportedly forged links with the military elite, including General Wiranto. He has pledged to implement the economic reforms required by the IMF. After Wahid's election, General Wiranto said he was willing to serve as Vice-President if accepted by the upper house.⁴⁹ However, he then decided against standing and the Vice-Presidency was won by Megawati.

The indigenous Indonesian military industry is very small and under-developed, given TNI's historical and current requirements, and is almost exclusively concentrated on small arms and aircraft. Indonesia produces the Belgian FN FNC 5.56mm and Italian BM 59 7.62mm rifles, the Italian Model 12 9mm sub-machine gun, and the Singaporese 40AGL 40mm grenade launcher.

Indonesia also makes several varieties of Western air transports. IPTN produce the Spanish CN-235, and Nurtanio produce the Spanish NC-212 and NC-235 aircraft. Indonesia also produces helicopters. Nurtanio produce the French NAS-332, the American Bell 412, and the German Bo-105.⁵⁰

Indonesia appears to be diversifying into naval equipment. In December 1997, the Indonesian Navy presented 2 home-made battleships to the Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition in Malaysia. The ships are called KRI Pandrong-801 and KRI Singa-651.⁵¹

Indonesian military priorities presently appear to be focused on repressing the great unrest which seems to be spreading around the country. In a speech to the Indonesian parliament on 21st September 1999, Dr Habibie, fending off criticism of his handling of the East Timor crisis, said "I have done the best I could ... I have been able to prevent balkanisation".⁵² Prior to the economic crisis and the resulting unrest, Indonesia seemed concerned to upgrade its capability to maintain archipelagic integrity, particularly with their search for very modern air defence fighters and the upgrade of their naval capability.

In addition to the moratorium on arms purchases of January 1998, ABRI suffered cuts. These were mainly with regard to imports, though defence attachés, operational readiness training, ceremonies and co-operative exercises were also cut,⁵³ which were unlikely to greatly affect Indonesian military effectiveness given their current responsibilities repressing internal dissent. Despite these cuts in February 1998, two new organisations for combat training were set up to improve the quality of junior and mid-level officers.⁵⁴

Perhaps the most significant military development since Suharto's removal has been the announcement that the police are to be no longer under TNI's jurisdiction. Initially, the chief of national police will report to the Minister of Defence (the TNI Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto), and then probably the Minister of Home Affairs (currently held by a military officer). The change will be complete by 2001 and military ranks will be replaced by traditional police titles.⁵⁵ Given that police powers do not appear to be changing and the fact that they will still be reporting to military officers, this change appears to be more cosmetic than real.

The Indonesian regime has been willing to use its foreign-obtained weapons for repressive purposes, both against its own people and the East Timorese.

Intent

In public statements, the regime has made its intentions clear:

A multi-battalion counter-insurgency exercise was held near Timika, Irian Jaya, on 10th and 11th December 1996. Colonel de Wanna (the commanding officer of the exercise) admitted the exercise was explicitly designed to show the local population their capabilities.⁵⁶
In March 1997 General Tanjung announced his forces would shoot on sight any violators of electoral law.⁵⁷ The regime also used UK-made tanks for the purpose of keeping order.⁵⁸
In August 1997 Indonesia announced an increase in military spending in "anticipation of increased terrorist activities"⁵⁹ - the meaning of which can be deduced by:
General Tanjung stated in Jan 1998 that he was preparing for violence⁶⁰ because of the economic problems and said that any opposition to the government would be "sliced to pieces".⁶¹
In February 1999 a shoot-to-kill policy to quell civil disturbances was introduced by the ABRI Commander-in-Chief General Wiranto and was ratified by parliament.⁶²
Following this, on 22nd February 1999, the Indonesian chief of police, General Roesmanhadi declared police officers would be sacked if they defied any order from General Wiranto to shoot rioters and criminals on the spot.⁶³

Indonesia

Sadly, the Indonesian government has been keen to show that it is prepared to match its words with deeds in Indonesia (both under Suharto and Habibie):

In April 1998 during a demonstration in Medan, Sumatra, thousands of students were tear-gassed.⁶⁴
In 1998 Alvis tanks were used to suppress demonstrations in Jakarta. Specifically, on May 12th six students were killed and on November 13th twelve were killed.⁶⁵
During "Operasi Wimbawa '99", the purpose of which was to track down a Free Aceh Movement leader, the military killed 21 civilians in two separate incidents on the 3rd and 9th January 1999.⁶⁶
In early February 1999, 5 people were shot dead by police in Aceh as people listened to a speech by the Free Aceh movement in the village of Idi Cut. Police claimed only 2 deaths but admitted 51 arrests.⁶⁷
On 14th February, 1999, soldiers and police officers fired on warring Christians and Muslims on Haruku Island, 1400 miles north-east of Jakarta, as they refused to disperse when ordered. The government claimed 11 out of the 21 fatalities died from gunshot wounds, the Indonesian Communion of Churches put the death toll at 23. The Indonesians took advantage of General Wiranto's shoot-to-kill law ratified by parliament a week before.⁶⁸
At least 2 people died on the Indonesian island of Ambon after troops fired warning shots at clashing Christian and Muslim rioters in early March 1999.⁶⁹
During Dr Habibie's brief visit to Banda Aceh on 26th March 1999, tens of thousands of protesters calling for a referendum were confronted by troops with teargas and rubber bullets, who proceeded to wound more than a hundred people, many of them seriously.⁷⁰
In Aceh on 3rd May 1999, at least 38 protesters were killed by regular troops. The massacre, known as the "Dewantara Tragedy", took place near the city of Lhokseumave. Troops opened fire without warning on demonstrators, continuing to fire as they fled. Over 150 were seriously wounded. The government was unapologetic and broadcast film of the bloodbath across Indonesia.⁷¹
In June 1999, following a new Indonesian army crackdown in Aceh, at least 56 people were killed by the army in Beutong. Reports suggest over 200 were killed by the army in operations in Aceh.⁷² Following this there were reports TNI was to soften its tactics. General Wiranto ordered the withdrawal of anti-riot police and restricted army battalions to defending major industrial complexes. An amnesty was announced for all Aceh Merdeka insurgents and their supporters conditional upon their ceasefire and laying down of arms.⁷³ How long this will persist given previous Indonesian actions in Aceh is debatable.
Seven people died, including one policeman, during two days of rioting in Jakarta against a new security bill passed by parliament in September 1999. All the civilian casualties were killed by live ammunition.⁷⁴

There was much violence in Indonesia in late 1997 and 1998 (some estimates suggest 1200 died in May 1998 alone⁷⁵) due to the economic crisis. There are no doubt many more examples, but finding accurate information is difficult. Suffice to say these examples confirm the continuing brutality of the regime and thus suggests that many more died due to ABRI's actions and foreign-supplied weapons.

East Timor

During the years since 1975, the Indonesian military has carried out many atrocities in East Timor, most estimates putting the death toll resulting from the Indonesian invasion at 200,000 (approx. one-third of the population). These atrocities continued throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. In 1991 over 100 people died when Indonesian troops opened fire on demonstrators in the East Timorese capital Dili. Around the time Labour came to power atrocities were still occurring. On 23rd March 1997, 7 Timorese youths were killed and 42 wounded by security forces at the Mahkota Hotel in Dili, East Timor, as they tried to meet the UN special ambassador Jamsheed Marker.⁷⁶ The long-time Falintil guerrilla fighter David Alex was captured by Indonesian forces in late June 1997 and died in captivity the next day. ABRI claim that he died of gunshot wounds, others claim he was tortured.⁷⁷ During the first 8 months of 1998 there were 37 confirmed extra-judicial killings in East Timor.⁷⁸ It also came to light that British-made Saracen and Saladin armoured vehicles were being used in East Timor.⁷⁹ Both the Labour and Conservative governments had refused to revoke the licences for these vehicles.

Dr Habibie announced on 27th January 1999 that a referendum would be allowed in East Timor, enabling the population to choose between political autonomy within Indonesia or full independence.⁸⁰ The Indonesian military proceeded to arm pro-Jakarta civilians to create para-military groups to destabilise the country by a campaign of terror. In December 1998, Colonel Suratman (the Indonesian Commander-in-Chief in East Timor) wanted to arm 440 villages to "protect" them against pro-independence rebels.⁸¹ The pro-Indonesian East Timorese leader Domingo Soares, contrary to the military claim, denied having asked the Indonesians for arms.⁸² The military organisation of militias perpetrating human rights abuses in East Timor in 1998 was known of by the international community. The US Department of State noted the existence of paramilitary squads perpetrating human rights abuses in East Timor in 1998. It said "the Government ... also relied on bands of youths, organised and directed by the military, to intimidate and harass its opponents. Civilian paramilitary groups frequently were involved in human rights abuses".⁸³ The militias quickly started to regularly perpetrate atrocities. In January 1999, paramilitaries carried out killings in the village of Galitas in the Covalima district of East Timor. Eleven other villages were reportedly terrorised in a similar fashion.⁸⁴ The Indonesian army admitted arming paramilitary groups which killed civilians. Paramilitary commander Kansio Lopez, despite General Wiranto's denial that arms were being given to militias, stated that army equipment had been used by militias against a rebel outpost where six people were killed. An army spokesman said the militias were armed for "protecting people against the rebellion in East Timor".⁸⁵ Other massacres carried out by paramilitary militias occurred in Liquisa (6th April 1999) and Dili (17th April 1999).⁸⁶

Just over two weeks after the Dili massacre, the agreement between the UN, Indonesia and Portugal over the referendum was concluded in New York on 5th May 1999. Scandalously, the Indonesian security forces were left responsible for security, despite their arming and condoning of militia atrocities in the previous six months. The UN mission to East Timor comprised 1,040 people from 70 countries.⁸⁷ Nevertheless, violence in the period up to the referendum continued, with the UN delaying it from 8th August to 30th August for security reasons. Before the referendum it was estimated that paramilitary operations in East Timor killed hundreds of Timorese and forced 40,000 people to flee their villages in fear of violence.⁸⁸ Military involvement in the violence continued right up until referendum day. On the Tuesday before the ballot, the UN had the local army commander in Maliana replaced, after overwhelming evidence that he was orchestrating the violence there.⁸⁹ However, two were killed in Maliana on the following Friday, the UN blaming the Indonesian police for failing to control the militiamen.⁹⁰ The militia connection with the Indonesian military cannot be doubted. Joao Tavares, a militia chief in Maliana, was the local governor, a reward for leading a pro-Jakarta militia that fought beside ABRI during the 1975 invasion. He worked alongside Lieutenant-General Yunus Yosfiah (now Minister for Information), whose men killed 5 Western journalists in the invasion's aftermath. Tavares, speaking a few days before the referendum, said "if the vote is for independence, I can tell you there will be war".⁹¹

The referendum ballot took place on 30th August 1999. Incredibly, despite the militia intimidation, 98.6% of registered voters turned out. Out of the valid votes 94,388 (21.5%) backed autonomy within Indonesia and 344,500 (78.5%) favoured independence. Following the overwhelming vote for independence, there followed the worst violence seen in East Timor for many years. Independence supporters and UN staff (at least 4 were killed⁹²) suffered many atrocities. Dr Habibie's response was to sign an order imposing martial law in the territory, giving the military full control over the province.⁹³ The Indonesians reinforced their forces with troops from KOSTRAD (the elite strategic reserve).⁹⁴ The West was only then prepared to admit what it had known all along – that the Indonesian military were responsible for orchestrating the terror. President Clinton said "it is now clear that the Indonesian military is aiding and abetting the militia violence".⁹⁵ Belatedly, the Indonesians agreed to allow a multinational force into East Timor, although previously they had assured the international community that they could still ensure security. The scale of the violence in just a few weeks is both astounding and appalling. The UN estimates that 500,000 of the 890,000 population were displaced. 150,000 of these are being detained in Indonesian camps in Indonesian West Timor, whilst the rest went into hiding in East Timor.⁹⁶ Many have been killed.

For many years Indonesia's regime was based on an intermingling of military, economic and political interests. The military, led by Suharto, used Western anti-Communist fears and their desire to exploit Indonesian natural resources, to acquire weapons to maintain archipelagic integrity and secure the regime politically by using them against dissenters. The regime's denial of human and labour rights, and resulting wage suppression, created conditions conducive to inward investment. Much of the profits of this were used to greatly enrich the elite. The rapid industrialisation prompted by foreign investment created a veneer of legitimacy, however, this was destroyed by the financial crisis.

Since Suharto's fall, a section of the elite's interests are being dismantled (the source of Suharto's wealth was being "investigated" by Dr Habibie,⁹⁷ though after a year it was concluded as there was "insufficient evidence"⁹⁸ of corruption), for example Prabowo's meteoric rise had been halted. Dr Habibie needed to maintain Western goodwill for economic reasons, and seemed to be slowly liberalising (e.g. granting a referendum to East Timor and electoral law) against a background of great civil unrest. Given the vested interests he represents, and the interests of the West in having order maintained so the economy can be rescued and thus their credit repaid, the underlying necessity for Indonesia's elite to purchase foreign arms seems ever-present. Indonesia's military spending has declined in terms of foreign purchasing power, but TNI's current manpower, firepower and readiness looks to remain near, or at, past levels. The military seems to be retrenching, trying to preserve internal security at all costs, demonstrated by recent events in East Timor. Whether Indonesia will painfully liberalise, as many commentators seem to expect, or the military will cling on to power, is a question still to be answered - although, given the violence in East Timor and General Wiranto's political ambitions, it seems the military is digging in its heels more than ever. Nevertheless, given the increase in violence in Indonesia and the appalling actions of TNI in East Timor, the continuing vicious nature of the regime and their need to use resources in more productive ways, there is no excuse for any government to sell Indonesia any arms.

Equipment with a military use or with "dual" military/civil use needs a licence before it can be exported from the UK.

Policy under the Conservative government was drawn up within the parameters set out in the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) document "Purpose of UK Arms Export Controls"⁹⁹ of 1996. This states in part a) that the government must adhere to the UK's international obligations which include:

A respect for human rights in the country of final destination (EU Common Criteria).
That the arms are not to be used other than for the legitimate defence and security needs of the recipient state (UN Security Council).
That the arms not be used for the violation or suppression of human rights and fundamental freedoms, for the purposes of repression or other than for the legitimate defence needs of the recipient state (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe).

Part d) stated that part of the purpose of controls was "to avoid contributing to internal repression and instability", part f) "to avoid contributing to human rights abuses", and part g) "to avoid aggravating/prolonging existing armed conflicts".

The Major government's stated policy was, "We do not licence for export any UK defence equipment which we judge likely to be used for internal repression".¹⁰⁰ The Conservatives justified arms exports to Indonesia saying that none of the equipment was used in contravention of the above principles. They also repeatedly justified arms sales to Indonesia licenced by them by declaring a) not all countries had indigenous military industries and thus they had a legitimate right to buy arms for self-defence, b) the exports would reduce British manufacturing unit costs, therefore making purchases for the UK armed forces cheaper, and c) the threat to jobs if the volume of sales were scaled back.¹⁰¹

The incoming Labour government in May 1997 announced a change in foreign policy, declaring it would henceforth pay more attention to ethical considerations. Robin Cook, the new Foreign Secretary declared human rights would be at the "heart of British foreign policy," and said, "We will not permit the sale of arms to regimes that might use them for internal repression or international aggression. We shall spread the values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy which we demand for ourselves". The use of "might" was a significant tightening of export policy. Robin Cook in July 1997 said that he would "refuse to supply the equipment and weapons with which regimes deny the demands of their peoples for human rights." More specifically, he said this would "result in changes to the present policy governing the licensing of riot control vehicles, small arms and other equipment for sale to the security forces of certain regimes".¹⁰² In addition to these guidelines, Robin Cook made some specific statements about Indonesia. On the 29th August 1997 he laid out his policy objectives on Indonesia which were:¹⁰³

Strengthening the UK and Indonesia's commercial relationship, applauding UK export growth to the country and Indonesia's economic performance.
Improving the environment.
Improving human rights in Indonesia. He defended this on economic not ethical grounds, saying "civil liberty and open government are not the enemies of economic success but the conditions for economic competitiveness".

He thus proposed a six-point plan including open meetings with human rights leaders and lectures by British police on non-violent crowd control.

British Aerospace [top]

The UK has a long history of licensing the sale of British Aerospace (BAe) Hawk jets to Indonesia, beginning in 1978. On the 22nd November 1996, 16 Hawk-209 aircraft were licenced for export to Indonesia, the licence was to be valid for four years.¹⁰⁴ The Conservative government had judged that they were not "likely" to be used for internal repression by repeatedly stating that there was no evidence Hawks had ever been used against people in East Timor or Indonesia.¹⁰⁵

The licence was still outstanding when Labour came to power and at the time of writing the Hawks have started to be delivered. Given that government policy stated arms exports would be refused if they "might" be used for internal repression, there was pressure on the government to revoke the licence.¹⁰⁶

The purpose of Hawk aircraft and the Indonesian inventory

The Hawk aircraft licenced under the Conservatives in November 1996 are the Hawk-209 model. The purpose of the Hawk-209 is not in doubt. The manufacturers, BAe, describe it as a "single-seat, radar equipped, lightweight, multi-role combat aircraft, providing comprehensive air defence and ground attack capability".¹⁰⁷ The International Institute for Strategic Studies classifies it as "Fighter, Ground Attack", not as "Fighter".¹⁰⁸ Given that Indonesia in November 1996 was attempting to purchase US F-16 and Russian Su-30K aircraft (which are very modern air superiority fighters), and that the Indonesian force of ground attack aircraft was looking dated (consisting mainly of A-4 Skyhawks, Hawk-53s, Hawk-109s, and OV-10 Broncos¹⁰⁹), it is very likely the Indonesians bought the Hawk-209s to add more punch to their inventory of ground attack aircraft, not for air defence, the other possible use of the Hawks. However, as at present the F-16 deal is off the agenda (and has been for some time due to US reluctance to sell), and the Su-30K deal is dead due to the Indonesian financial crisis, the Indonesians may well, in future, opt to use the Hawk-209s in an air defence role as well.

Use of Hawks

With their ground attack capability, the Hawks could be used for internal repression and counter-insurgency exercises. Clearly any evidence that Hawks in the past had been used for "internal repression" would suggest that they "might" be used for such a purpose in the future. East Timorese leaders have frequently asserted that Hawks have been used in attacks on the East Timorese population since 1978.¹¹⁰ Robin Cook clearly at one point believed the same. In 1994, attacking the Conservative Trade Minister Richard Needham in the Commons he stated, "Hawk aircraft have been observed on bombing runs in East Timor in most years since 1984".¹¹¹

The Conservatives had claimed that there was no evidence that Hawks had in the past been used in such a role.¹¹² Labour in government agreed with the Conservative claims and said there was no satisfactory evidence Hawks had been used in East Timor.¹¹³ In October 1997 the new government broadened this statement declaring that having studied all available information they were confident that Hawks had not been used in East Timor or in a counter-insurgency role in Indonesia.¹¹⁴ The late Derek Fatchett (the Foreign Office Minister responsible for Indonesia) confirmed this in May 1998.¹¹⁵ However, General Wiranto admitted on 23rd July 1999, at Surabaya naval base, that Hawk fighters were flying over East Timor in routine reconnaissance exercises.¹¹⁶ The Indonesian ambassador to the UK claimed that the two flights on 16th July 1999 were providing general security.¹¹⁷ Initially, Robin Cook wrote to the Indonesian government voicing his concern,¹¹⁸ but was later forced to admit that Hawks are currently being used in East Timor. This was not sufficient to deter the Indonesians from using them on a regular basis for military operations in East Timor. An Indonesian air defence official in Jakarta said that Hawks were flying regularly over East Timor to detect any encroaching foreign aircraft. Three Hawks are currently based at the airport of Kupang, the capital of West Timor. The Foreign Office said it was "alarmed and dismayed" by the reports.¹¹⁹

Given the mass of anecdotal evidence that Hawks had been used for repression (which Robin Cook once believed), and that Cook now accepts that they are being used for military purposes, why is he prepared to sanction the export of these aircraft now? One is left to conclude that Labour's "ethical" policy is all talk. Clearly, the government does not feel that the financial returns for BAe shareholders are worth risking to ensure these Hawks will not be used to kill Indonesians and East Timorese. Coincidentally, Lord Hollick, a member of the board of British Aerospace, was also a DTI adviser at the time of the Labour decision not to rescind the licence.¹²⁰ The words of Sir Ken Jackson of the AEEU (a trade union which is a Labour Party donor) are perhaps more likely to represent the government's attitude. In September 1997 he said the loss of the Hawk deal would destroy the trust between Britain and Indonesia, with the potential loss of £1 billion of trade and the employment resulting from it.¹²¹

The situation at present

Until the situation in East Timor became desperate, the government made no attempt to revoke the Hawk licences, particularly as the Hawks were being delivered. Two Hawks (the first of the deliveries) from the 1996 deal were delivered on 21st April 1999, two on 11th May 1999, three on 3th August 1999,¹²² and three on 23th September 1999.¹²³ The sixteen were due to be delivered in the seven months after April 1999 (each one is worth approximately US$30 million).¹²⁴ They are (initially at least) to be based at Supadio Air Force Base near Pontianak, West Kalimantan to guard against threats to Indonesian security on the island of Borneo, the South China Sea and oil and gas interests.¹²⁵ They are also to ensure security in Kalimantan. An incidental side-effect of the deployment will be to protect Western economic interests in the region.¹²⁶ So far as we know, they are not planned to be used for internal repression, but given the Indonesian government's record since 1978 they "might" well be so used in the future. However, after the vicious repression of the East Timorese people by the Indonesian military and pro-Indonesian militias following the referendum vote in favour of independence, there was considerable pressure on Robin Cook to suspend or cancel further arms exports to Indonesia. On 11th September 1999 Cook announced the suspension of existing arms export licences to Indonesia and that the UK would press for an EU-wide ban on further arms sales to Indonesia¹²⁷ (although the EU Parliament has been calling for member states to "stop all military assistance and arms exports to Indonesia" since November 1994). This was to affect in particular the ongoing Hawk deliveries to Indonesia. Regrettably, the ban is only due to last four months (until 16th January 2000, with the licences validity extended afterwards by the period of the suspension – 123 days¹²⁸), so we can assume that, if the UN peacekeeping mission in East Timor goes relatively smoothly, normal service will be resumed for the Indonesians.

Farcically, it was revealed that three Hawk jets were in Bangkok, Thailand, en route to Indonesia at the time and could not be affected by the ban. The Indonesians stated that the delay in their reaching Indonesia had been due to pressure put on BAe by Robin Cook.¹²⁹ However, it transpired that the real reason was that one of the pilots delivering the aircraft had contracted diarrhoea in Bangkok.¹³⁰ The three Hawks arrived on 23rd September 1999.¹³¹

Recently, it has become apparent that the Indonesians are in fact returning some Hawks to the UK. They have decided that they do not require all 12 of their Hawk-53s and are to return 5 through BAe to the UK in exchange for spares. The RAF and DERA (Defence Evaluation and Research Agency) both have a shortfall and 2 have been returned already.¹³²

The UK government has assisted the deal by permitting BAe to use the DTI's Export Credits Guarantee Department (ECGD) to guarantee the deal. In February 1998 Margaret Beckett, then President of the Board of Trade, stated that the 1996 Hawk deal had been guaranteed by the ECGD to the tune of £280m, which represented 87% of the value of ECGD support for military exports for Indonesia in 1995-6,¹³³ and 80% of the purchase price.¹³⁴ This sum had risen with interest to £362m in February 1998.¹³⁵ In September 1998 the Indonesian government, because of its financial problems, had to reschedule a portion of its debt relating to the UK.¹³⁶ The government and Indonesia renegotiated, as a result of which the Indonesians are to start payments again in 2000 and the delayed payments will be repaid from 2003.¹³⁷ The rescheduling agreement included principal instalments of US$167 million relating to the Hawk deal.¹³⁸

The taxpayer is paying for the training of the pilots of Hawk aircraft. By July 1998 the RAF had trained 5 instructors and 24 student pilots.¹³⁹ George Robertson confirmed later that two RAF loan service personnel had been assisting with the introduction into service of the Hawks from the 1993 deal, but had now left.¹⁴⁰ BAe have also agreed to provide training for Hawk pilots.¹⁴¹

Heckler & Koch [top]

Heckler & Koch is a subsidiary of BAe, having been taken over in 1991. The company manufactures the 9mm MP5 sub-machine gun, a weapon used by many military and police forces worldwide, capable of firing 800 rounds per minute. Indonesia has been described as "Heckler and Koch country", and the MP5 is used by Indonesian special units. In 1995 the Indonesian Marines were reported to be taking delivery of the MSG 90 sniper rifle.¹⁴²

British Aerospace transferred technology for Turkish production of Heckler & Koch weapons in 1998. The weapons are manufactured under licence in Turkey by Makina ve Kimya Endustrisi Kurumu (MKEK) near Ankara. The Turkish news agency Anadolu reported on 25th July 1998 that MKEK would export 500 MP5 sub-machine guns to Indonesia in1999. The weapons were to be exported to the Indonesian Police Department.¹⁴³ Given the brutal record of the Indonesian Special Forces and Police both before and after Labour came to power, it is scandalous that the government allows a UK company to produce small-arms in another country, which is then free to export them to Indonesia, bypassing any UK arms export controls.

Alvis [top]

On 9th December 1996, the Conservative President of the Board of Trade Ian Lang announced he had granted a licence for 50 Alvis Scorpion vehicles plus associated equipment.¹⁴⁴ The vehicles had 90mm guns and 2 machine-guns fitted as standard. The associated equipment included ammunition, radio equipment and spare parts.¹⁴⁵

Alvis vehicles are described as "easily adaptable to such varied roles as convoy escort, internal security or as a light tank".¹⁴⁶ Like the Hawks, the Alvis deal was not complete when Labour came to power, and like the Hawk deal, the new government decided to let the licences continue, despite its power to revoke them.

Given the nature of the Alvis vehicles and the Indonesian regime it would have been hard to deny that the vehicles "might" be used for internal repression. Unfortunately, there are many instances where they have been. Scorpion vehicles were used on a campus at the Islamic University of Indonesia at Ujung Padang, South Sulawesi in April 1996 against students protesting against bus fare increases and military brutality. Three students were killed and many more injured. The UK government acknowledged that Alvis armoured vehicles exported in the 1960s were used in the incident and that excessive force was applied in breach of Indonesian assurances.¹⁴⁷ This incident (though not the admission that Scorpions were used) happened before Ian Lang gave the go-ahead for the December 1996 licence.

Scorpion vehicles were also filmed being used during disturbances where protesters were killed e.g. on May 12th 1998 at Trisakti University in Jakarta and on 13th November 1998 in Jakarta.¹⁴⁸ Alvis-made vehicles have apparently been used in East Timor as well. Colonel Halim (the Indonesian embassy defence attaché in London) admitted on the "Mark Thomas" show¹⁴⁹ that Saracen and Saladin vehicles were deployed there, where Indonesia continues to use violence to deny human rights.

The £80 million December 1996 deal was crucial in propping up Alvis's profits. Alvis reported profits down 38% up to 31st March 1997 but were forecast to rise as a result of the deal.¹⁵⁰ The Labour government washes its hands of culpability in incidents involving Alvis vehicles on the grounds that such equipment was not licenced by them, yet refused to revoke the outstanding Alvis licence when it could have done, and had evidence they were being used for internal repression. The government has also supported the deal by allowing the ECGD to guarantee it. Alvis vehicles were covered by the ECGD to the tune of £65 million in 1996 and US$3.2 million in 1997.¹⁵¹ It is not known if the ECGD's guarantee for Alvis is included in the rescheduling agreement.

Land Rover [top]

In September 1998 the government supplied details of three arms export licences granted by the Conservatives to Land Rover in 1996-7, under the criteria ML6 and PL5031:¹⁵²

17th December 1996: 130 Defender 110 General Service Vehicles and 10 Defender 90 General Service Vehicles.
17th January 1997: 20 Defender 110 General Service Vehicles and 20 Defender 90 General Service Vehicles.
15th April 1997: 20 Defender 110 General Service Vehicles and 20 Defender 90 General Service Vehicles.

These vehicles can be used for cargo and troop carrying, towing and patrol roles.¹⁵³ The Labour government, as with all licences issued under the Conservatives, has failed to revoke them.

GKN [top]

Ian Lang also announced in December 1996 that he had issued a licence to Procurement Services International Ltd, for a variety of vehicles including seven Tactica water cannon. These are made by Glover Webb, a company that was bought by GKN in 1994. The associated equipment for the licence covered nearly 300 vehicles but no contract seems to have been agreed for their supply between PSI and Indonesia. Water cannon, which had ECGD cover,¹⁵⁴ were however supplied. Like the Hawk, Alvis, and Land Rover deals the Labour government refused to revoke the licence. Derek Fatchett announced that, after reviewing allegations, the evidence of Tactica water cannon being used for repressive purposes was inconclusive,¹⁵⁵ although allegations have been made about the use of such equipment to put down demonstrations in Bandung in June 1996, where dye was allegedly sprayed on students.¹⁵⁶

In May 1998, Kaman and GKN Westland were reported to be contestants to supply the Indonesians with shipborne anti-submarine helicopters for the Indonesian Navy's six Ahmad Yani frigates. GKN Westland were offering their Super Lynx 300 helicopter and apparently were looking to supply them after the crisis eased, hopefully around 2000-2001.¹⁵⁷ Perhaps this was the reason that HMS Richmond, in Jakarta in April 1997 on communications and practice approaches for replenishment at sea exercises, gave a demonstration of her Lynx helicopter as she left port?¹⁵⁸

Courtalds [top]

On the 26th September 1997 Robin Cook announced on the "Today" programme that he had blocked two arms contracts to Indonesia, apparently demonstrating that there was some substance to his ethical foreign policy. One of the contracts was with Courtalds Aerospace to provide six armoured Land Rovers for Indonesian police protection. The other was for the supply of sniper rifles. Together the value of the deals came to £1 million. While the cancellation of these contracts is welcome, it pales into insignificance compared with the value and lethality of weapons sold in other deals both before and after Labour came to power.

This minor concession to an "ethical" foreign policy was nevertheless overshadowed by rumours of Tony Blair's displeasure at Cook's action¹⁵⁹ Reportedly he wanted more attention paid to clearing the backlog of licence applications which had built up as a result of Labour's new policy¹⁶⁰ Furthermore, the doubts about Labour's real commitment surfaced in a leaked letter from George Robertson (the Defence Secretary) to Cook¹⁶¹ in which Robertson emphasised that in addition to the loss of an "£850K contract" for Courtalds, it could lose possible future business with Indonesia and that the commercial reprisals could be made against the UK. Shockingly, he painted KOPASSUS¹⁶² as merely a counter-terrorist organisation in the Western mould and described its now-disgraced commander General Prabowo as "enlightened".¹⁶³

GEC Marine [top]

GEC Marine talked to Indonesia about the possibility of supplying mini-submarines for special operations.¹⁶⁴

In July 1999 the Labour government stated that it had revoked no arms export licences to Indonesia since it had come to power up to 18th June 1999.¹⁶⁵ It is difficult for the government to justify any of the arms export licences referred to above on the grounds that there is no possibility for use of the equipment in internal repression. As the licences referred to above were in force when Labour came to power, and although they have been suspended for four months, this brings us to the question as to whether it would be legal for Labour to revoke arms export licences and whether, if it did, the government would be liable to pay compensation to UK manufacturers.

Article 7(1) of the Export of Goods (Control) Order 1994 states a licence "may be varied or revoked by the Secretary of State at any time". Assuming there is no guarantee in the licences about duration or compensation (it would be remarkable if there was), there would be no liability incurred by the government if it decided to revoke the Hawk licences. Justice Laws, in refusing a judicial review of the 1996 licences for Alvis and Tactica exports to Indonesia, said "the use of discretion will inevitably proceed with general foreign policy considerations in mind".¹⁶⁶ Given the announced change of policy under Labour to more emphasis on human rights, the licencees would be unreasonable to expect compensation. If the licencees did win a judicial review case over the matter, the court would have no power to order the government to compensate them. The Labour government is thus wrong when it claims that it would have to compensate manufacturers for revoked licences.¹⁶⁷ The precedents for revoking licences (Iraq, Somalia, and Yugoslavia) did not result in the government fearing compensation claims - the DTI said it would decide on a case by case basis, implying there was no legal redress for the licencees.¹⁶⁸ In fact, by agreeing to the EU arms export ban of four months (although the UK had been prepared to countenance an open-ended suspension), the government demonstrated that there were no legal obstacles to revoking or suspending export licences, as the Export of Goods (Control) Order stated. At the time of writing, the government had not stated it expected to compensate manufacturers for delays incurred by the suspension, nor had the companies concerned demanded any.

Derek Fatchett thus argued that revoking the licences is not "realistic or practical"¹⁶⁹ for the Labour government. This "spin" is used even by the Prime Minister. When the Portuguese Prime Minister Antonio Guterres complained to Prime Minister Tony Blair that Labour was permitting the Hawk deal to be concluded, according to Guterres Blair said it was not "practical" for contracts signed under the previous administration to be rescinded.¹⁷⁰ Given that this essentially bureaucratic problem is presented as the only barrier to rescinding the licences, this is a pathetic excuse, serving little purpose except to camouflage Labour's real attitude, examined below.

The following two tables detail all the arms export licences in respect of Indonesia issued by the UK Government between 1994 and 1998. Standard Individual Export Licences (SIELs) allow shipments of specified goods to a specified consignee up to the quantity specified in the licence, for a specified period of time. Open Individual Export Licences (OIELs) are specific to an individual exporter but cover multiple shipments of specified goods to specified destinations.¹⁷¹

Standard Individual Export Licences covering exports to Indonesia on the Military List issued by the UK Government from 1994 to the end of 1998:¹⁷²

Licence
Catagory

Description

94

95

96

97
Con

97
Lab

98

Lab
till
end
98

ML1

Small arms, machine guns and accesories

4(1)

4(2)

1(3)

0

0(3)

2(1)

2(4)

ML 2

Large calibre weapons, including howitzers, motors and flame-throwers

5(1)

2(1)

3

1

2

2

4

ML 3

Ammunition for ML1 ML2 and ML26

3(3)

3

1(1)

0

0

1

1

ML 4

Bombs, torpedaoes ,rockets ,missiles ,mines etc

3

1

0

0(1)

2

1

3

ML 5

Fire control and warning equipement

6(1)

4

1

2

1

1

2

ML 6

Military vehicles e.g. tanks and APCs.

4

13

9

4

0(1)

1

1(1)

ML7

Toxicological agents, riot control agents

1(1)

0

2

0

1

0

1

ML 8

Military explosives and propellants

2

0

0

0

0

0

0

ML 9

Combat vessels

4

0

1

0

0

1

1

ML 10

Aircraft and aircraft equipment

10

8

27

6

11

16

27

ML 11

Electronic equipment not specified not specified elsewhere,but not for military use

22

13

15

4

15

9

24

ML 13

Armoured or protective goods e.g helmets.

1

1

6

6

3

2

5

ML 14

Equipment for military training

4

4

3

0

2(1)

2

4(1)

ML 15

Military imaging equipment

2(1)

6

4

1

0

2

2

ML 18

Equipment and technology for productionof military goods

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

ML 21

Software for simulation and evaluation

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

ML 22

Technology for development and production

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

ML 24

Software for simulation and evalutation

0

1

3

1

0

0

0

PL 5002

Telescopic sights for firearms other that those included under ML5

0

1

0

0(1)

0

0

0

PL 5006

Explosive handling devices

1

2

2

0

0

2

2

PL 5017

Equipment for development of or use of military goods

0

0

1

0

0(1)

2

2(1)

PL 5018

Smooth-bore weapons, not in ML1

0(3)

0

0(1)

0

0

0

0

PL 5021

Ammunition, including projectiles

0(2)

0

0

0

0

0

0

PL 5027

Technology applicable to developement or use of good s in ML11, ML18 etc.

2

3

0

0

0

0

0

TOTAL
NUMBER

68(5)

60(3)

77(4)

20(2)

35(6)

41(1)

76(7)

Figures in brackets relate to the number of refusals of applications in the relevant categories.

Open Individual Export Licences covering exports to Indonesia on the Military List issued by the UK Government from 1994 to the end of 1998:¹⁷⁵

Licence
Catagory

Description

94

95

96

97 Con

97 Lab

98

Lab
till
end
98

ML 4

Bombs, torpedaoes ,rockets ,missiles ,mines etc.

3

0

1(1)

0(1)

(0)1

1

1(1)

ML 5

Fire control and warning equipment

2

0

2

0

0

1

1

ML 6

Military vehicles e.g. tanks and APCs.

0

0

1

0

0

0

1

ML 8

Military explosives and propellants

6

0

0

0

0

0

0

ML 9

Combat vessels

6

0

3

2

0

1

1

ML 10

Aircraft and aircraft equipment

8

3

8

1

0

6

6

ML 11

Electronic equipment not specified elsewhere, but not for military use

4

3

4

0

0

7

7

ML 13

Armoured or protective goods e.g helmets.

2

0

1

0

0

0

0

ML 14

Equipment for military training

0

0

3(1)

0

0

1

1

ML 15

Military imaging equipment

0

0

0

0

0

1

1

ML 16

Forgings, castings, and other unfinshed products

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

ML 17

Miscellaneous goods, materials and libaries

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

ML 18

Equipment and technology for productionof military goods

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

ML 21

Software for simulation and evaluation

1

0

1

0

0

2

2

ML 22

Technology for developement and production

0

0

0

0

0

2

2

ML 24

Software for military purposes

1

0

2(1)

0

0

0

0

PL 5001

Other security and paramilitary equipment Police "goods"

1

0

0

0

0

0

0

PL 5017

Equipment for development of or use of military goods

1

0

1

0

0

0

0

PL 5027

Technology applicable to developement or use of good s in ML11,ML18 etc.

3

0

1

0

0

0

0

PL 5028

0

0

1

0

0

0

0

TOTAL NUMBER

27

6

22(1)

3

0(1)

15

15(1)

Figures in brackets relate to the number of refusals of applications in the relevant categories

Analysis

Superficially read, the table would seem to indicate that Labour's ethical policy has made a great difference to the UK arms trade to Indonesia. In 1997 and 1998, the two years where Labour has been in power have seen the lowest number of SIELs issued since 1994. In fact 1998, Labour's first full calendar year in office, saw the number of SIELs issued nineteen lower than the previous lowest total since 1994. Likewise the OIEL figures for 1997-8 compare favourably with the record under the Conservatives.

However, these figures are meaningless until compared with the number requested and refused. One reason the figures are lower is of course because the Indonesians since mid-1997 have had great difficulty in affording purchases of foreign military equipment due to the depreciation of the rupiah. If one looks at the proportion of licences issued compared to those refused, the picture looks different. Since 1994 the Conservatives have issued 225 SIELs and refused 14; Labour have issued 76 and refused 7. The Conservatives refused 5.9% of applications and Labour 8.4%; the difference Labour's policy is making is statistically insignificant. Furthermore, since Labour came to power the proportion of licences refused to those issued has declined. 6 of the 7 licence applications refused were in Labour's first 8 months, the other in the next 12 months. In 1998 Labour only refused 2.4% of SIEL applications (the lowest figure since 1994), and no OIEL applications (in fact it has refused none since it came to power). Thus, at the time of writing, according to the figures it is easier for arms exporters to acquire licences for exports to Indonesia from the UK government than at any time since 1994.

Information on what equipment has been licenced for export under Labour is very difficult to come, by given the rules on commercial confidentiality which the government adheres to. We can nevertheless make some preliminary observations. The decline in the value of ECGD cover for arms exports over the last two years (totalling £22.3 million in 1997-9¹⁷⁶), the number of SIELs and OIELs issued, plus the Indonesian scrapping of any further major arms purchases until the financial crisis eases, suggests that the value of arms exports licenced under Labour has greatly declined from previous years. Robin Cook said on 14th May 1998 that "[licences] have been given for things like naval patrol boats, radar on the offshore oil-rigs, offshore winches for the naval boats; these are not things that could conceivably be used in internal repression".¹⁷⁷ The Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls of March 1999 states that the SIELs from Labour's election up to the end of 1997 were for:

"communications equipment, aircraft spares, military helmets, aircraft machine gun spares, an air defence alerting device, communications encryption equipment, naval electronics, radar spares, electrical components, body armour, air defence missile spares, pilot displays and components, electronic equipment, an aircraft simulator, spares for aircraft engines, aircraft breaking parachutes, communications equipment, protective forensic equipment and a military simulator."

The licences granted are probably for small consignments, although we should note that some come under the categories of ML1, ML2 and so forth, categories of equipment that "might" be used for internal repression. Having said this, most of the licences granted under the Conservatives were probably for similarly small amounts - the 1996 Hawk deal ECGD cover was 87% of ECGD cover for military exports to Indonesia in 1995-6. The fact remains that, like the Conservatives, Labour are allowing the Indonesians to upgrade their military capability, which has in the past been used for repressive purposes.

The Annual Report on Strategic Export Controls published in March 1999 gives some information about arms exports to Indonesia between May and December 1997. 23 "Armoured Combat Vehicles" and 4 "Combat Aircraft" left the UK for Indonesia in 1997, valued by HM Customs and Excise at £112,490,000. The report does not state under which licences the exports were carried out, which manufacturers were responsible etc. However, the 1998 UN Register on Conventional Arms tells us that the 23 vehicles were 12 Tactica Armoured Personnel Carriers, 10 Stormer Armoured Personnel Carriers and 1 Bridgelaying vehicle. The 4 aircraft were 1 Hawk 109 and 3 Hawk 209s. (It seems a little ludicrous that the government will not publish this information in its own report, despite allowing the UN to publish it). The UK's return to the UN Register for 1999 disclosed that in 1998 UK arms exports to Indonesia comprised 39 Armoured Combat Vehicles including 30 CVR(T) Scorpions, 5 Stormer Command Vehicles, 2 Stormer Recovery Vehicles, 1 Stormer Logistics Vehicle and 1 Stormer Ambulance Vehicle.

Training for the Indonesian Armed Forces and Police

The key thing to remember about the Indonesian police is its paramilitary role – for many years it was a branch of the ABRI (armed forces), although it has recently separated. Despite the police's involvement in repression, Cook announced on 29th August 1998¹⁷⁸ that his efforts to aid human rights improvement in Indonesia would include increased police training.

The Labour government also permits UK institutions to train Indonesian military officers, sometimes being generous enough to use taxpayers' money. On 1st June 1998 John Reid (the minister of state for the armed forces) admitted that 11 Indonesian officers were attending Ministry of Defence courses in the UK (one at Joint Services Command and Staff College in Bracknell and ten at the Royal Military College at Shrivenham) and 18 were attending non-military establishments, studying subjects such as defence administration and international law and human rights.¹⁷⁹ However, a report in "Private Eye" stated that seven out of the ten officers attending a security studies course at Hull University were from KOPASSUS, and that whilst between 1993 and 1997 the Conservatives only permitted one Indonesian officer to train at Shrivenham, as soon as Labour came to power ten were admitted.¹⁸⁰ In February 1999 Doug Henderson (John Reid's successor) stated that the number of Indonesian military personnel training in UK military establishments was five. One Navy officer is at the Joint Service Command and Staff College and another is on an International Principal Warfare Officer Course at HMS Dryad. Both of these gentlemen are receiving £85,000 in financial support from the Defence Military Assistance Fund. Three Indonesian officers are at Shrivenham as part of a "private and commercial initiative" by Cranfield University. Four Indonesian military personnel are at non-military educational establishments in the UK. They are undertaking the Chevening scholarship programme at a cost of £100,000¹⁸¹ (the funding for the scheme is provided by the Foreign Office). Two months later he stated that eight Indonesian military personnel were attending training courses in the UK.¹⁸²

The Export Credits Guarantee Department provides loan guarantees to UK exporters, both civil and military. It is financed by companies paying premiums to ECGD, like any normal insurance scheme. The latest figures for ECGD exposure for Indonesia state that ECGD is exposed to the tune of £691 million for defence related equipment.¹⁸³ ECGD exposure was worth £1,747.4 million on all UK exports to Indonesia at the end of the 1997-8 financial year (second only to China),¹⁸⁴ declining to £1,541 million (with £48 million in respect of unrecovered claims) in May 1999.¹⁸⁵ On 23rd September 1998, the UK agreed to reschedule Indonesia's public sector debt, though for payments of principal only. The agreement covered debt in relation to civil and military contracts signed prior to July 1997. The restructuring covers over 200 principal repayments falling due for payment between 6th August 1998 and 31st March 2000 (worth around £260 million¹⁸⁶), with the rescheduled debt to be repaid over eleven years with a three year grace period.¹⁸⁷ The rescheduling included US$167 million of principal repayments for the Hawk deals,¹⁸⁸ and 75% of the rescheduled debt is in respect of defence business.¹⁸⁹ Figures show that ECGD guarantees on military and security equipment exports to Indonesia were worth £143.6 million in 1996-7, £16.5 million in 1997-8, and £5.8 million in 1998-9. So far ECGD has paid out £1.7 million of premiums as a result of the 1996-7 guarantees (the money was paid in 1998-9), but none so far in relation to the 1997-8 or 1998-9 guarantees.¹⁹⁰ Recently it has emerged that for all military and security equipment exports under ECGD cover, £25 million has been claimed by manufacturers but not recovered from the Indonesian government¹⁹¹ (This is a £14 million increase from the figure in February 1999¹⁹²). ECGD has built up considerable liabilities on arms sales to Indonesia. If there are insufficient premiums to cover claims then the UK taxpayer is the ultimate guarantor. ECGD's stated policy is that it "pays out claims to banks and exporters in the event of buyer default" which are "recovered through debt rescheduling".¹⁹³ ECGD abets arms trading to Indonesia by allowing its state-backed insurance scheme to be used by arms manufacturers.

The UK government uses taxpayers' money to promote arms exports to Indonesia. The Defence Export Services Organisation has an office in Jakarta, established in 1991, with three staff and a budget for 1999-2000 of £80,000.¹⁹⁴ The MoD also invited Indonesia (along with nearly 60 other countries) to the Defence Systems and Equipment International exhibition at Chertsey, Surrey and London Docklands in September 1999. Lady Symons, the Defence Procurement Minister, had claimed Indonesia had a right under the UN charter to look at equipment on offer for "self-defence".¹⁹⁵ Despite pressure from the Foreign Office on the MoD, the MoD was not prepared to withdraw their invite, even after the appalling bloodshed in East Timor had been going on for over a week. In fact it was left to the Indonesians to decline the invitation. Scandalously, an MoD spokesman said "Certain things are obviously on their mind domestically and they are obviously busy with things in East Timor".¹⁹⁶ A week before, even the director of the Defence Manufacturers Association, Alan Sharman, suggested he had expected the Indonesians not to be invited¹⁹⁷

The UK taxpayer also finances Indonesian military development in other ways. The UK has been supplying military aid from the Defence Military Assistance Fund to Indonesia in recent years. This money is mainly used to promote and support UK defence exporters, although it is also used for training (see above). However, as Indonesia has decided to postpone further defence imports since the financial crisis, the volume of aid has declined. The latest figures are:¹⁹⁸

1995-6: £691,880 (of which £583,000 was used to support military exports)
1996-7: £1,675,280 (of which £1,629,080 was used to support military exports)
1997-8: £62,400 (of which £19,700 was used to support military exports)

Further financial support for the arms trade to Indonesia was offered by the taxpayer under the Trade Fair Support Scheme to the Society of British Aerospace Companies for the Indonesian Air Show in June 1998.¹⁹⁹

In opposition Labour made a great deal out of the fact that when it was in government it would be more open than the Conservatives, who were frequently criticised for being too secretive with government information. Robin Cook promised that "Labour will...publish an annual report on the UK's arms exports giving more information to Parliament and the public than is currently available."²⁰⁰ The first was published in March 1999, 22 months after Labour came to power. Although the government stated on page 1 that it had fulfilled its pledge of increasing transparency, the Report included only some information about the type of equipment licenced, the manufacturer, or the number of items. In fact, as far as Indonesia was concerned, more detail was already in the public domain as a result of Parliamentary questioning. The inadequate information given about the training of overseas military, security, or police personnel in answer to Parliamentary Questions is not improved upon in the Report. Given the government's pledge, the Report's lack of detailed information is disappointing, particularly as other details have recently become available, from the unlikely source of a letter in the "Sydney Morning Herald" of 10th May 1999 by the UK's High Commissioner to Australia. More open in his statements than the UK government has hitherto been, he stated that the government had not "approved the export of any howitzers, flame-throwers, mortars or machine-guns to Indonesia." He then said the small arms exports to Indonesia in 1998 comprised a "handful of sporting rifles", which were "the only small arms export since the UK general election." He went on to state, "The only ammunition export that has been approved has been naval training ammunition."

On 21st December 1998, the Labour-led Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee issued a report on Foreign Policy and Human Rights. It rejected the parliamentary scrutiny of export licence applications on the grounds that it would damage UK military exports and jobs (although it acknowledged that, in the US, Congress scrutinises all military export licence applications and also admitted no damage was done to US arms sales as a result - they are the world's largest arms exporter after all!). Even the very vague information the government does provide about the arms trade has its problems. For any licence, it is impossible from government information to tell what it covers, as the categories are so broad, for example a licence in the category ML10 could be for 16 Hawks or merely 16 crash helmets. Likewise the DTI has admitted that its databases are not fully comprehensive, as for any single application for a licence covering a range of goods not all entries on the application are necessarily recorded. Despite its "openness", the information the government provides makes it very difficult to ascertain the full nature of arms exports to Indonesia. If the government is committed to an ethical foreign policy, then surely openness and democratic accountability must be more important than commercial confidentiality, particularly when arms are sold to regimes with appalling human rights records. The government's refusal to be open about the arms trade displays a lack of commitment to open government and prevents real scrutiny of their "ethical" policy being carried out.

Labour has been very keen to defend its "ethical foreign policy" towards Indonesia by stating that "Britain has given active support to the referendum process [in East Timor]."²⁰¹ However, despite many reports that the Indonesian military had been attempting to destabilise the referendum process through violence (see above) and the proven record of brutality by the Indonesian military since 1965, Robin Cook supported the original referendum agreement signed by the UN, Indonesia and Portugal in New York on 5th May 1999, which gave the Indonesians responsibility for maintaining security during the referendum. Shockingly, his subordinate's view was that "a real test for Indonesia will be whether the army and police assume a role of impartiality"²⁰² and Cook stated after the referendum, "We would not allow the cry of freedom of the people of East Timor to be drowned in blood."²⁰³ As the post-referendum violence took place, Tony Blair wrote to Dr Habibie telling him the killing and destruction must stop because the crisis was causing great damage to Indonesia's world standing and could damage its ability to attract investment.²⁰⁴ The MoD resisted an embargo on arms sales to Indonesia for almost a fortnight whilst the worst of the killing took place. One report suggested that it was only after Tony Blair, the Foreign Office and the DTI lined up against the MoD that their objections to the embargo were crushed.²⁰⁵ Despite the widely publicised actions of the Indonesian military and pro-Indonesian militias after the referendum, the UK resolution agreed by the UN for the peacekeeping mission gave the Indonesian military responsibility for maintaining security in East Timor and for the return of refugees.²⁰⁶ The government has refused to back its "ethical" foreign policy with appropriate action.

It is far better to judge policy by deeds not words. Since it has come to office, the Labour government has talked a good game but conspired to continue to promote the arms trade to the repressive regime of Indonesia, breaking almost all its "ethical" guidelines. The government could have revoked the outstanding licences issued under the Conservatives without fearing financial loss, yet it chose not to do so. In the cases of Hawks, the Scorpion vehicles, and GKN, given the companies' description of the equipment and previous Indonesian use of similar or identical equipment, Robin Cook's statement that he would "refuse to supply the equipment and weapons with which regimes deny the demands of their peoples for human rights" rings very hollow. The government needs to be much clearer about what licences have been granted for categories like ML1, ML2, ML3 etc. Items in these categories "might" be used for internal repression. BAe's subsidiary Heckler & Koch has this year exported sub-machine guns to Indonesia where they are used by KOPASSUS and the police, who have an appalling human rights record. ECGD guaranteeing of UK arms exports to Indonesia, and Government permission for Indonesian officers to train in the UK, is evidence Labour supports and upgrades a military that sponsors para-military death-squads in East Timor, slaughters unarmed civilians in Aceh and uses a shoot-to-kill policy against demonstrators. Is this what putting human rights at the "heart of British foreign policy" and spreading "the values of human rights, civil liberties and democracy which we demand for ourselves" really means? Given that the government has also admitted many times that no formal monitoring systems for the end-use of UK-supplied equipment exist,²⁰⁷ it beggars belief that the government can supply arms to such a vicious regime and claim it is doing so within its established criteria. The government has also failed to provide proper scrutiny of UK arms exports. It has broken both the spirit and the letter of its promises. Certainly, there seems to be some confusion in the civil service as to what Labour's "ethical" policy really amounts to. Despite the new government issuing 91 arms export licences up to 31st December 1998, officials from the UK embassy in Jakarta attended a book launch by the pro-democracy PIJAR movement. The book was titled "Stop Arming Indonesia."²⁰⁸

Despite the government's feeble denials of wrong-doing, we do have some examples of their real attitude on both their "ethical" foreign policy and arms sales. Robin Cook, on his tour of South-east Asia in the summer of 1997, declined to meet the Trade Union leader, Muchtar Pakpahan, who was under arrest for sedition (he had for example called for a referendum on East Timor).²⁰⁹ His snub to a man who has long campaigned for the improvement of human rights in Indonesia, calls into question Robin Cook's commitment to human rights being "at the heart of British foreign policy", and contradicts his policy objective of holding open meetings with human rights leaders. Before Labour came to power, Blair's office issued a press release stating, "A new Labour government will be committed to creating the conditions in which the [defence] industries can thrive and prosper. Winning export orders is vital to the long-term success of Britain's defence industry. A Labour government will work with the industry to win export orders."²¹⁰ George Robertson's letter pleading for Robin Cook to change his decision on the Courtalds order should be read in this light. Arms companies seem to know this is the government's real attitude towards ethics. Nicholas Oliver, Managing Director of Procurement Services International and a Territorial Army Captain, talking about arms sales to Indonesia said, "Mr Blair's view is that the type of equipment that the Conservatives have given export licenses to would present no difficulty for the Labour government."²¹¹ Sadly, the accuracy of this statement became all too apparent when Robin Cook's Parliamentary Private Secretary Ken Purchase attempted to defend him by blaming others, suggesting he had been overruled by the DTI and MoD. He said "Robin did everything he possibly could to progress with policies which he felt were right. In the end you make an agreement with your colleagues. The DTI was very anxious to be a friend of business and industry."²¹²

Blair and Cook's policy seems to be to export arms to Indonesia regardless of its human rights record and the possible uses of the weapons, improving shareholder profit even if it means the death or denial of human rights for people whom the weapons are used against. That is the real Labour attitude.

This section attempts to give an overview of the arms trade to Indonesia outside of the UK. Naturally, information on arms deals is hard to come by and the extent of the treatment of each country receives reflects only the amount of information available from UK sources, and may or may not be a true picture of countries' relative involvement.

The US [top]

The US has historically been a major supplier of arms to the Indonesian regime, particularly after the invasion of East Timor in 1975.²¹³ This was largely for geopolitical reasons - the US wanted to secure the Ombai-Wetar straits for the passage of its nuclear submarines, especially after the Communist victory in Vietnam in 1975 gave the USSR access to Indochinese bases. The other consideration was to provide countervailing power to China and the growing Communist influence in South-East Asia to arrest the "domino" effect and protect US and Australian economic interests in the region.

Recently, there has been growing pressure in the US for arms sales to undemocratic and repressive regimes to be halted. A Code of Conduct Bill on arms sales was introduced in 1995-6 in Congress by Representative Cynthia McKinney (Democrat) and Senator Mark Hatfield (Republican). The bill aimed to prohibit US arms sales to governments which were undemocratic, abused human rights, engaged in aggression or refused to participate in the UN Arms Register. The bill was defeated in both Houses.²¹⁴ The Senators voting against the bill on average received eight times more in contributions to their campaign funds from military industry than those voting in favour. In 1995/6, the top 25 US weapons exporters donated US$6.5 million for candidates' and party funds, demonstrating the US military industry's lobbying power. Since Clinton's steps to halt some US arms exports to Indonesia and the collapse of the F-16 deal, pressure in and out of Congress to stop any US arms sales to Indonesia has mounted. The state of Massachusetts has been taking action against US arms sales to repressive regimes. In January 1997, two Massachusetts lawmakers of Portuguese descent tried to put state procurement bans on firms which did business with Indonesia, as the state had recently done in the case of Burma.²¹⁵ On 19th March 1997, Representative Patrick Kennedy (Democrat) introduced a bill prohibiting military assistance and arms transfers to Indonesia, unless there were free elections, no hindering of Non-Governmental Organisations, political prisoners were released, labour rights improved, troop levels reduced in East Timor, religious freedom was granted to the East Timorese and a dialogue over East Timor was begun between Indonesia and Portugal.²¹⁶ On the 10th June 1997 the US House of Representatives unanimously passed an unprecedented legislative amendment condemning Indonesian human rights abuses in East Timor, and a State Department spokesman criticised Indonesian "democracy".²¹⁷ On 12th November 1997 in a vote on Indonesia, Congress stated it did not expect US weapons to be used in East Timor.²¹⁸ On 3rd September 1998, the Senate voted to prohibit the transfer of lethal military equipment to Indonesia if it was intended for use in East Timor.²¹⁹

The position of the Clinton administration is ambiguous. President Clinton agreed to a voluntary ban on the export of US small arms to Indonesia and followed this by extending it to include helicopter-mounted armaments (1995) and armoured personnel carriers (1996).²²⁰ In addition to this he co-sponsored a UN resolution calling for greater human rights in East Timor.²²¹ Whether this was a result of the investigation of the extent to which US arms manufacturers fund top politicians or out of "ethical" concerns is unclear. William Cohen, the US Secretary of State for Defence who led the effort to block the Code of Conduct Bill and the effort to establish a US$15 billion arms export loan guarantee unit, has been a major beneficiary of arms manufacturers campaign contributions.²²² Allegations that the Indonesia-based Lippo Group provided illegal funding to Clinton's re-election campaign in 1996 plus mounting concerns about the Suharto regime caused the proposed sale to Indonesia of 9 F-16 fighter planes, spare parts and support worth US$200 million, announced in August 1996, to be postponed until January 1997.²²³ Suharto's anger at what he saw as unjustified criticism of him in Congress caused him to cancel the deal in early June 1997.²²⁴

The US arms industry is still fighting its corner, however. It attacked the cancellation of the F-16 deal, Joel Johnson, vice-president of the US Aerospace Industries Association, saying Congress's attitude was "just one more example of how we insult our customers, leaving the Europeans looking better as a result".²²⁵ It used the announced Su-30K deal with the Russians to apply pressure to Congress and the administration to lift restrictions on US arms exports.²²⁶ They have a powerful backer inside the administration. Cohen, on a visit to the Far East in January 1998 encouraged US arms companies to maintain their contacts with the Indonesians so as to be in a good position if the financial crisis eases.²²⁷ US military assistance for Indonesia still continues. The International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) lists its value in 1996 at US$0.6 million, in 1997 at US$0.1 million, in 1998 at US$0.4 million and projects the same figure for 1999.²²⁸ Likewise geopolitical considerations still seem to hold sway in other parts of the American polity. A report quoted Marvin Ott, a professor at the Pentagon as saying that when the US was constrained by domestic politics over Indonesia the Australians "stepped in to fill the breach."²²⁹ The stability of the South-east Asian countries as a counter to China in the region still seems a paramount US concern. The US ex-ambassador to Jakarta Paul Wolfowitz stated that "it will be very difficult for the Chinese to meddle" if the present balance of power was preserved. A joint US/Indonesian military exercise in West Java in early May 1998²³⁰ suggests maintaining Indonesian combat readiness and capability is still important for the US. Recently, it came to light that Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander-in-Chief of US forces in the Pacific, after the Liquisa massacre (6th April 1999) where 60 died, initiated US riot control training for TNI. He also sent a US Air Force officer to train Indonesian pilots, whilst failing to demand the shut down of militia operations in East Timor²³¹ In the aftermath of the referendum on East Timor, Clinton somewhat belatedly announced a $100 million US arms embargo to Indonesia²³² and said "it is now clear that the Indonesian military is aiding and abetting the militia violence. This is unacceptable."²³³ Military exercises and exchanges with Indonesia were also frozen, and General Wiranto's invitation to a meeting of Asia-Pacific military chiefs in Hawaii in October 1999 was cancelled.²³⁴

The US has certainly in recent years been more progressive than most countries in taking steps to ensure arms for internal repression do not find their way to Indonesia. Clinton has taken some limited steps, and there seems to be a significant lobby in Congress who are trying to tackle the arms to Indonesia problem. Nevertheless, given the revelations of the Lippo group's funding for the Clinton re-election campaign, plus the large amount of corporate donations from arms companies to members of both parties, it could be suggested that Clinton's measures may be merely tactical. Certainly the actions of his Defence Secretary William Cohen and the Pentagon would seem to suggest that there is considerable pressure inside the Clinton administration to continue the past policy of arming Indonesia.

The Australians have long been complicit in providing diplomatic and military support to Indonesia's regime, partly due to their desire to obtain allies against Communist influence in South-east Asia from Vietnam and China, and partly due to their desire to exploit the rich natural resources around Timor and the Indonesian archipelago. The economic motive for Australia has become more significant in recent years as China's increasing energy shortages have made the need to ensure protection of such resources for Australian exploitation more urgent.

Until recently, Australia had always turned a blind eye to the brutal Indonesian actions in East Timor. In January 1978 Malcolm Fraser's government gave de facto recognition to Indonesia's annexation, allowing drilling in the oilfields of Challis and Jabiru in the Timor Gap to begin. In 1985 the Labour government under Bob Hawke recognised the integration of East Timor into Indonesia, and in 1989 Australia and Indonesia signed a treaty dividing the Timor area into zones with exploration rights allocated to each country. Between 1986 and 1991 the Australian government gleaned AUS$31 million from the sale of permits to oil companies to exploit natural resources in the region.²³⁵

In May 1997, Australia and Indonesia agreed a $1 billion military package to protect the Natuna gasfield in the South China Sea, including provision for airborne early-warning systems, maritime patrol aircraft, frigates, SAMs and air-surveillance radar.²³⁶ The Australians had already sold the Indonesians 20 Nomad maritime patrol aircraft which arrived in January 1997.²³⁷

In November 1997 military ties between the two countries were increased with the expansion of the exchange scheme of Indonesian and Australian officers for training purposes,²³⁸ as well as the holding of joint naval exercises with the Germans in the same month.²³⁹ The IISS listed Australian military aid to Indonesia in 1996 as worth US$4 million, in 1997 it was worth US$4.5 million and in 1998 US$3.5 million.²⁴⁰

The Australians had increased their military ties with Indonesia over the last few years, with no regard to the political situation in East Timor or Indonesia. The ties were explicitly linked to protecting Australian economic interests around the Indonesian archipelago. In the run up to the referendum, the Australians appeared to have become twitchy over the possibility of Indonesia granting independence to East Timor, their diplomats claiming that an independent East Timor would collapse into chaos and violence.²⁴¹ They seemed to prefer that East Timor be granted autonomy under Indonesia's aegis. In addition to the furthering of their own economic interests, the Australian government has apparently connived to act on behalf of the US when domestic politics constrained the White House.

However, belatedly, Australia did condemn the recent violence in East Timor and its handling by the Indonesian military. They are the main provider of troops and logistical support for the multinational peacekeeping force.

New Zealand [top]

New Zealand has recently made an entry into the international arms trade to Indonesia. In October 1998 the concern Safe Air of Blenheim, New Zealand was awarded a contract by the Indonesian Air Force to refurbish two TA-4J Skyhawks from the US. The export was approved by the US government and the refurbishment work was approved by the New Zealand government. The Skyhawks arrived in New Zealand by mid-January 1999 to begin their avionics upgrade. They were due to be delivered to Ujung Padang in the first half of 1999,²⁴² although they are now expected to be shipped to Abdulrachman Saleh in September 1999.²⁴³ The Skyhawk is an ageing ground-attack aircraft that saw extensive service in a counter-insurgency role in Vietnam and has been part of the inventory of the Indonesian Air Force since 1978.

New Zealand has severed military ties with Indonesia since the referendum on East Timor.²⁴⁴

Russia [top]

The Russians in recent years have emerged as potential big players in arms sales to Indonesia, particularly after the cessation of Cold War hostilities, the blocking of the F-16 deal by the US, the desperate Russian need for hard currency, and the remaining size of the Russian military-industrial complex. Angry at being unable to acquire F-16s for the foreseeable future, the Indonesians have been looking elsewhere to upgrade their air defence capability. In August 1997, the Indonesians were reported as having decided to buy 12 Su-30K fighters and 8 Mi-17IV helicopters from Russia.²⁴⁵ No strings were attached to the deal in terms of end-use or the improvement of Indonesia's human rights record. Later that month it was reported that the helicopters were likely to be used by KOPASSUS for Special Forces transportation.²⁴⁶

In October 1997 the Su-30K deal was reportedly worth US$650-1000 million with the prospect of further Indonesian purchases of Su-30Ks in the future.²⁴⁷ The Su-30Ks were to be based at Ujung Pandang air base to protect the Natuna gas field. Eight Russian flying instructors were also to be sent to train Indonesian pilots to fly the Su-30K.²⁴⁸

The advent of the Asian financial crisis and its particular severity in Indonesia soon put paid to the deal. Originally the Indonesians were to pay partly in palm oil, coffee and rubber. In January 1998, given the massive fall in the value of the Indonesian rupiah against the US dollar, the Indonesians tried to renegotiate the deal to only finance 15% of the value instead of 35%, itself reduced from the original 70%).²⁴⁹ Soon after, Indonesia announced the postponement of the deal and in August 1998 newly installed President Habibie's hostility to it and funding problems meant it was never likely to be resurrected, certainly not in the foreseeable future.²⁵⁰

In July 1997, Indonesian Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Arief Koeshara announced the purchase of a naval personnel transport from Russia.²⁵¹

France [top]

In 1994 Indonesia ordered 20 Light LG1 105mm cannon from Giat, in 1996 18 VBL wheeled amphibious scout vehicles, and in February 1997 18 ULTRAF reconnaissance vehicles.²⁵² In June 1997 the French awarded President Habibie a medal (the highest the French government can award to an official of another country) for his role in promoting French-Indonesian relations and industrial development in Indonesia.²⁵³ The French military attaché said no strings, as regards human rights or end-use, would be attached to a possible deal for the Mirage 2000 fighters, which at the time was the Su-30K's rival in the bid to supply Indonesia with air defence fighters.²⁵⁴

At the beginning of 1997, Thomson-CSF, Paris (a company with over twenty years experience of working in Indonesia) won a $50 million contract from IPTN to supply mission systems for Indonesian maritime patrol aircraft and helicopters.²⁵⁵

French complicity in arming the Indonesians did not stop there. French arms exports to Indonesia in 1998 were worth roughly double the UK total of £112,490,000.²⁵⁶ The French (along with the Dutch) lobbied the EU hard to reduce the arms embargo announced in the wake of events in East Timor, from an open-ended one to four months. The rationale was that a longer ban would be counter-productive , one diplomat saying "it could tip the political balance in favour of the hardline military".²⁵⁷

Germany [top]

In January 1997 it was reported that the Indonesian navy would acquire 4 submarines from Germany²⁵⁸ following on from large earlier naval purchases from Germany.²⁵⁹ In April 1997 it became apparent that the deal was for 5 Type 206 second-hand diesel attack submarines.²⁶⁰ The German companies STN Atlas Elektronik and Abeking & Rasmussen shipyard were marketing a midget-submarine for Indonesia in August 1997.²⁶¹ Like many other foreign arms deals at the time, the financial crisis resulted in the deal being indefinitely postponed in January 1998. Nevertheless, no doubt wishing to maintain its naval ties for possible commercial advantage when the crisis eases, the German navy took part in naval exercises with Australia and Indonesia in November 1997.²⁶²

Belgium [top]

In December 1997, it was reported that SABCA had fallen behind schedule. The Belgian company has been contracted to upgrade Indonesia's 12 F-5 fighters for $40 million since 1995, to give them communality with F-16s and Hawks.²⁶³ However, recently it appears that the first 2 upgraded F-5s were delivered back to Iswahyudi on 15th February 1999, and the first local upgrade was expected to commence in August 1999.²⁶⁴

Sweden [top]

In April 1996 the Swedish government approved the export of 3 Bofors naval cannon to Indonesia.²⁶⁵

Thailand [top]

Between the 7th and 16th July 1997, the Indonesians and Thais took part in a joint naval exercise in the Java Sea, Gundul Island and the waters around Jakarta. They practised convoy escort and anti-submarine warfare.²⁶⁶

South Korea [top]

At the end of 1997, the South Korea Air Force placed a US$143 million order with the Indonesian aircraft manufacturer IPTN for eight CN-235-220 military transports.²⁶⁷ The deal was primarily to be funded through barter, with South Korea supplying Indonesia with locally built military vehicles. By early 1998 South Korea and Indonesia's economic problems resulted in South Korea falling behind in the initial progress payments.²⁶⁸

Japan [top]

In November 1997 the Japanese accepted Indonesian personnel for training at its National Defence Academy.²⁶⁹

South Africa [top]

In a meeting with Suharto in July 1997, Nelson Mandela thanked Suharto for supporting him during the anti-apartheid campaign. He said he hoped good relations would continue, boosting bilateral trade and Indonesian investment in South Africa, and said he would permit the sale of South African arms to Suharto for external defence.²⁷⁰ Later Mandela gave Suharto the Order of Good Hope medal in return for Suharto's contributions to African National Congress funds in the South African elections.²⁷¹

China [top]

In May 1997 the Chinese sold Indonesia riot-control equipment including plastic visored helmets, body shields, electric wands, and tear-gas grenade pistols.²⁷²

With respect to Indonesia, the Labour government has failed to deliver on the pledges it made on an ethical foreign policy. By refusing to cancel the licences for the sale of BAe Hawks, Alvis Scorpion vehicles and Tactica water cannon, the government allowed the export to Indonesia of weapons which "might" be used for internal repression and intimidation in the future, and almost certainly have been in the past. By supporting the upgrade of the Indonesian military in personnel and material terms, it has tacitly approved a government which denies human rights and perpetrates terror in both Indonesia and East Timor. The government has failed to give the Timorese people any support against their oppressors, in sharp contrast to the Western/NATO reaction to Kosovo. It has failed to be sufficiently open on the issue of arms sales, disabling effective scrutiny of its "ethical" behaviour.

Since Labour's election the human rights record of Suharto and Habibie has been appalling. Thousands have died at the hands of the Indonesian military whilst the perpetrators have not been brought to justice. That the Labour government has still been prepared to enable the upgrade of the Indonesian military for commercial reasons is scandalous. Sadly, its actions have been mirrored by much of the international community, which has been eager to sell weapons to the regime.

Having been hit by economic crisis and grave political instability, the last thing the Indonesians need is a further influx of weapons from the developed countries. In financial terms they are an unaffordable luxury, and in military terms they increase the lethality of a determinedly repressive military. There can be no justification for the conniving of the world in selling arms to the regime. The Labour government should take the lead by cutting off all contact with the Indonesian military, revoking all outstanding licences for arms exports to Indonesia, and refusing to issue any more.

1 TAPOL briefing, April 1997.
2 The Independent, 14th March 1997.
3 Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1997.
4 The Guardian, 22nd September 1999.
5 The Guardian, 20th October 1999.
6 Cited in British Arms Export Policy and Indonesia by Malcolm Chalmers (University of Bradford), May 1997, and Financial Times, 6th September 1998.
7 Indonesian Observer, 25th June 1999.
8 Time, 24th May 1999.
9 The Independent, 27th May 1998.
10 The Independent, 29th May 1998.
11 Time, op cit.
12 Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor by J.G.Taylor (Zed Books Ltd, 1991), pp 125-7.
13 Time, op cit.
14 The Engineer, 4th September 1998.
15 Air Forces Monthly, September 1997.
16 Flight International, 21st to 28th January 1998.
17 Air Forces Monthly, April 1998.
18 Air Forces Monthly, April 1999.
19 Air Forces Monthly, October 1999.
20 The Independent, 28th May 1998.
21 Financial Times, 1st July 1997.
22 The Guardian, 8th September 1999.
23 Thee Kan Wie, Indonesian Quarterly, 2nd quarter 1998.
24 The Independent, 9th January 1998.
25 The Sunday Times, 18th January 1998.
26 The Guardian, 8th September 1999.
27 Global Emerging Markets by Angus Armstrong and Michael Spencer (Deutsche Bank, August 1998)
28 Thee Kan Wie, op cit.
29 World Socialist, 22nd June 1999.
30 Dark Victory: The United States and Global Poverty by W. Bello (Pluto Press, 1999), p122.
31 World Socialist, 22nd June 1999.
32 (ibid).
33 Roche in Hansard, 1st June 1998.
34 The Military Balance, 1998/9 (IISS, October 1998), p181.
35 "Xinhua", 5th March 1999.
36 BBC News website, 4th March 1999.
37 Jane's Defence Weekly, 25th February 1998.
38 Financial Times, 22nd May 1998.
39 General Wiranto clearly is a moderate man. In February 1999 he introduced a shoot-to-kill policy into parliament to deal with civil disturbances (see below). He was an officer in KOPASSANDHA in 1975-9 (TAPOL briefing), the forerunner of KOPASSUS which, during Operasi Seroja in December 1975, slaughtered 80% of the male population of the East Timor capital Dili in one month (Indonesia's Forgotten War op cit., p68).
40 Jane's Defence Weekly, 3rd June 1998. General Prabowo, lost his post however, moving to become CO of the Armed Forces Command and Staff College.
41 Indonesia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998 (US Department of State, February 1999)
42 The Guardian, 8th September 1999.
43 The Financial Times, 6th September 1998.
44 Jane's Defence Weekly, 11th August 1999.
45 Indonesian Observer, 25th June 1999.
46 The Guardian, 20th October 1999.
47 The Guardian, 15th September 1999.
48 The Guardian, 20th October 1999.
49 BBC News website, 20th October 1999.
50 The Military Balance, op cit., pp 306-7, 312-3, 316.
51 News and Views Indonesia, December 1997.
52 The Guardian, 22nd September 1999.
53 Jane's Defence Weekly, 21st January 1998.
54 Jane's Defence Weekly, 18th February 1998.
55 Jane's Defence Weekly, 4th November 1998.
56 Jane's Military Exercises and Training, January - March 1997.
57 The Guardian, 5th March 1997.
58 The Independent, 14th March 1997. Also reported in "Republika", 21st February 1997 and AFP 21st February 1997.
59 Defence News, 28th July - 3rd August, 1997.
60 Jane's Defence Weekly, 21st January 1998.
61 The Guardian, 17th January 1998.
62 The Guardian, 17th February, 1999.
63 TAPOL website, www.gn.apc.org/tapol.
64 The Guardian, 30th April 1998.
65 TAPOL briefing, January 1999. The November 13th incident drew criticism from US State Department spokesman James Rubin who claimed security forces had used excessive force (BBC News website, 26th November 1998).
66 TAPOL website, op cit.
67 BBC News website, 4th February 1999.
68 The Guardian, 17th February 1999.
69 BBC News website, 10th March 1999.
70 Speech by Carmel Buriardjo (TAPOL) at the International Conference on Aceh, Washington, USA, 3rd April 1999.
71 Financial Times, 8th May 1999, and TAPOL website, op cit.
72 The Sunday Telegraph, 29th August 1999.
73 Jane's Defence Weekly, 1st September 1999.
74 The Observer, 26th September 1999.
75 BBC News website, 26th November 1998.
76 TAPOL briefing, 24th March 1997.
77 TAPOL bulletin, No. 141, July 1997 and The Times, 11th July 1997.
78 Indonesia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for 1998, op cit.
79 Admitted by Colonel Halim on the "Mark Thomas" show, Channel 4, 20th January 1999.
80 The Observer, 12th September 1999.
81 Jane's Defence Weekly, 16th December 1998.
82 Reuters, 19th February 1999.
83 (ibid).
84 The Observer, 31st January 1999.
85 The Observer, 7th February 1999.
86 TAPOL website, op cit.
87 The Daily Telegraph, 28th August 1999.
88 TAPOL website, op cit.
89 The Observer, 29th August 1999.
90 The Daily Telegraph, 28th August 1999.
91 The Sunday Telegraph, 12th September 1999.
92 The Daily Telegraph, 7th September 1999.
93 (ibid).
94 The Guardian, 8th September 1999.
95 The Daily Telegraph, 11th September 1999.
96 The Guardian, 6th October 1999.
97 The Independent, 18th March 1999.
98 Financial Times, 12th October 1999.
99 British Arms Export Policy and Indonesia, op cit.
100 Hansard, 3rd February 1997.
101 Letter from Jeremy Hanley (Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) minister responsible for Indonesia) to Dudley Fishburn MP, 15th January 1997.
102 Financial Times, 18th July 1997.
103 FCO News Department Press Release and The Guardian, 29th August 1997.
104 Letter from Barbara Roche (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Small Firms, Trade and Industry), to Jim Cousins MP, 24th November 1997.
105 Letter from Andrew Greenaway, (Defence Export Services Secretariat 3, MoD), 20th January 1997.
106 As Labour came to power the last of the Hawk-209 aircraft ordered in 1993 were being delivered to Indonesia, a contract worth £442 million (Jane's Defence Weekly, 28th May 1997).
107 The Facts, BAe, July 1998
108 The Military Balance, op cit., p183.
109 (Ibid).
110 Konis Santana (leader of the East Timorese resistance army) was reported as saying Hawks were used in the Indonesian assault of the late 1970s and 1980s (The Independent, 14th March 1997). Similar allegations have been made by many other East Timorese leaders, including Nobel Prize Winner Jose Ramos Horta.
111 Quoted by John Pilger in The Guardian, 25th January 1999.
112 Andrew Greenaway letter, op cit.
113 The Independent 14th July 1997.
114 Letter from Ms D.Pankhurst (South-east Asia Department, FCO), 14th October 1997.
115 Hansard, 12th May 1998.
116 From Indonesian website "Berita Buana", 24th July 1999, cited by BBC Summary of World Broadcasts.
117 BBC News website, 3rd September 1999.
118 The Independent, 21st July 1999.
119 Financial Times, 10th September 1999.
120 The Guardian, 29th July 1997.
121 AEEU Head Office Press Release, 5th September 1997.
122 Financial Times, 11th September 1999.
123 Flight International, 29th September – 5th October 1999.
124 Jakarta Post, 30th April 1999.
125 Jane's Defence Weekly, 10th March 1999.
126 The oil and gas interests in the South China Sea are mainly around the Natuna Islands. The Financial Times reported on 30th August 1997 that "officials hope...the approval of defence contracts will also help the interests of other sections of British industry which are bidding for billions of pounds worth of contracts linked to Natuna." An Amec (a UK construction company) spokesman was reported as saying "Natuna represents one of the biggest investment opportunities in the world".
127 The Observer, Sunday Telegraph and Sunday Times, 12th September 1999.
128 Export Control and Non-Proliferation Directorate, DTI website, 7th October 1999.
129 The Sunday Times, 19th September 1999.
130 (ibid).
131 Flight International, 29th September – 5th October 1999.
132 Air Forces Monthly, September 1999.
133 Hansard, 10th November 1997.
134 Hansard, 9th December 1998.
135 Hansard, 23rd February 1998.
136 The Independent, 26th September 1998.
137 (ibid).
138 Hansard, 9th December 1998.
139 The Observer, 10th May 1998.
140 Hansard, 9th July 1998.
141 TAPOL note, 11th August 1997.
142 Asian Defence Journal, November 1995.
143 Committees' Inquiry into the 1997 and 1998 Annual Reports on Strategic Export Controls (House of Commons, 15th June 1999), p19.
144 Hansard, 9th December 1996.
145 Hansard, 13th January 1997.
146 British Defence Equipment Catalogue, vol. 1, 1998, p102
147 TAPOL briefing, January 1999. Also The Independent, 14th March 1997, and Coventry Evening Telegraph, 30th May 1997 .
148 TAPOL briefing, January 1999.
149 Channel 4, 20th January 1999.
150 The Engineer, 22nd May 1997.
151 Hansard, 4th February 1999.
152 Letter from Barbara Roche to Roger Godsiff MP, 24th September 1998.
153 British Defence Equipment Catalogue, op cit., p222.
154 Hansard, 2nd June 1997.
155 Hansard, 10th December 1997.
156 The Guardian, report and photograph, 13th February 1997.
157 Flight International, 29th April - 5th May 1998.
158 Hansard, 12th May 1998.
159 Financial Times, 3rd October 1997.
160 Financial Times and The Daily Telegraph, 4th November 1997.
161 The Independent on Sunday, 26th July 1998.
162 In fact KOPASSUS is a military Special Forces unit. It has in the past taken part in counter-insurgency operations in East Timor and Aceh, and has close training links with the UK and Australian SAS regiments. (Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1997)
163 Prabowo's enlightened behaviour in the past took the form of taking part in atrocities committed during the brutal Indonesian invasion of East Timor. For example, he ordered the shooting of 20 Timorese in Bere-Coli, Baucau between 12th and 15th April 1989. (Indonesia's Forgotten War: The Hidden History of East Timor, op cit., p103) More recent examples include rumours of his sanctioning of KOPASSUS's torturing of pro-democracy activists in May – June 1998, shooting dead demonstrators in Jakarta in May 1998, and raping more than 100 Chinese women (The Independent on Sunday, 26th July 1998).
164 Jane's Defence Weekly, 14th May 1997.
165 Hansard, 20th July 1999.
166 R v President of the Board of Trade ex p TAPOL and others, 25th March 1997.
167 The Independent, 14th July 1997.
168 A letter from the International Affairs and Defence Section of the House of Commons Library dated 2nd June 1997, further stated "where licences are revoked...the companies concerned are notified by the DTI. Companies wishing to seek compensation can address claims to the DTI as the export licensing authority" i.e. not the courts.
169 Hansard, 31st July 1997.
170 The Guardian, 1st August 1997.
171 See Strategic Export Controls Annual Report (March 1999), pages 20 and 95 for a fuller explanation.
172 Hansard, 9th February 1999. Note individual licences may cover a range of goods with various ratings, and in these cases the licence is included in the table for all relevant ratings. Thus, the yearly totals may not be the sum of the individual licence applications.
173 The split for the year was compiled as follows. The figures for Labour are from the Strategic Export Controls Annual Report, published in March 1999 (They cover the period from Labour's election to the end of 1997. The figures for the Conservatives are the figures from Hansard, 9th February 1999 (referred to above) less the Labour figures.
174 These figures are the sum of the figures from the Strategic Export Controls Annual Report (covering Labour up to the end of 1997) and the 1998 figures in Hansard, 9th February 1999.
175 This table was compiled in identical fashion to the SIEL table.
176 Hansard, 25th January 1999.
177 These remarks were made in an interview on 14th May 1998, quoted in Menzies Campbell MP's briefing on UK arms exports under Labour up to 10th May 1998.
178 FCO Press Release op cit.
179 Hansard, 1st June 1998.
180 Private Eye, 17th April 1998.
181 Hansard, 22nd February 1999.
182 Hansard, 28th April 1999.
183 Hansard, 27th July 1999.
184 ECGD Annual Report and Trading Accounts 1997/8, p6.
185 Hansard, 6th May 1999.
186 Hansard, 23rd July 1999.
187 Hansard, 11th November 1998.
188 Hansard, 9th December 1998
189 Hansard, 23rd July 1999.
190 Hansard, 25th January 1999.
191 Hansard 8th June 1999.
192 Hansard 2nd February 1999
193 Letter from E.M.S.Lord (Defence Export Services Secretariat 2 (Policy), MoD), 9th February 1999.
194 Hansard, 23rd April 1999.
195 The Guardian, 1st September 1999.
196 BBC News website, 8th September 1999.
197 The Guardian, 2nd September 1999.
198 Hansard, 28th January 1999.
199 Hansard, 12th December 1997.
200 Letter from Robin Cook, 24th March 1997.
201 Robin Cook in The Observer, 19th September 1999.
202 Statement by Derek Fatchett MP, 6th May 1999.
203 The Observer, 19th September 1999.
204 The Daily Telegraph, 11th September 1999.
205 Financial Times, 15th September 1999.
206 The Independent, 16th September 1999.
207 Derek Fatchett in Hansard, 3rd June 1998, 3rd and 8th February 1999. Also Geoff Hoon in Hansard, 8th June 1999.
208 TAPOL briefing, December 1997.
209 The Sunday Times, 31st August 1997.
210 Cited in Robin Cook by John Kampfner (Victor Gollancz 1998), p142.
211 Nicholas Oliver made these statements to Jose Ramos Horta on "The World in Action" (9th June 1997). Blair denies having said this.
212 The Independent, 17th September 1999.
213 US arms exports to Indonesia totalled $1,118.9 million (in 1997 US$) between 1975 and 1995. By market share the US was the top arms exporting country to Indonesia between 1978 and 1991 and from 1992 to 1994. (US Arms Transfers to Indonesia 1975-97: Who's Influencing Whom? by William D. Hartung and Jennifer Washburn (World Policy Institute, May 1997)), pages 7 and 10.
214 The bill was defeated by 262 to 157 in the House of Representatives (May 1995) and by 65 to 35 in the Senate (July 1996). (ibid.)
215 Delta's Export License Review, January 1997.
216 Arms Trade News, April 1997.
217 TAPOL bulletin, No. 141, July 1997.
218 TAPOL bulletin, No. 144, December 1997.
219 Arms Trade News, October 1998.
220 US Arms Transfers to Indonesia, op cit, p6.
221 US Arms Transfers to Indonesia, op cit., p3.
222 US Arms Transfers to Indonesia, op cit., p15
223 Flight International, 19th to 25th March 1997.
224 Financial Times, 7th June 1997.
225 (ibid).
226 Flight International, 21st to 27th January 1998.
227 Jane's Defence Weekly, 14th January 1998.
228 The Military Balance, op cit., p181.
229 Financial Times, 23rd March 1998.
230 (ibid).
231 Red Pepper, October 1999.
232 The Sunday Times, 12th September 1999.
233 The Daily Telegraph, 11th September 1999.
234 Financial Times, 10th September 1999.
235 Indonesia's Forgotten War, op cit., pp170-1.
236 Flight International, 13th May 1997.
237 Jane's Defence Weekly, 15th January 1997.
238 Jane's Defence Weekly, 19th November 1997.
239 Jane's Defence Weekly, 12th November 1997.
240 The Military Balance, op cit., p181.
241 Reuters, 19th February 1999.
242 Air Forces Monthly, April 1999.
243 Air Forces Monthly, October 1999.
244 The Independent, 11th September 1999.
245 The Times, 6th August 1997.
246 Jane's Defence Weekly, 13th August 1997.
247 Air Forces Monthly, October 1997.
248 Jane's Defence Weekly, 5th November 1997.
249 Flight International, 14th January - 20th January 1998.
250 Flight International, 5th August - 11th August 1998.
251 Jane's Defence Weekly, 16th July 1997.
252 British Arms Export Policy and Indonesia, op cit.
253 "Antara", 4th June 1997.
254 "Antara", 12th June 1997. Also reported in Indonesia Daily News Online, 12th June 1997.
255 Jane's Defence Contracts, January 1997.
256 The Guardian, 8th September 1999.
257 The Independent, 14th September 1999.
258 Jane's Defence Weekly, 15th January 1997.
259 In 1992 Indonesia had bought the former East German Navy for the bargain price of US$12.7 million (Jane's Intelligence Review, January 1997).
260 Jane's Defence Weekly, 30th April 1997.
261 Jane's Defence Weekly, 3rd September 1997.
262 Jane's Defence Weekly, 12th November 1997.
263 Flight International, 17th - 23rd December 1997.
264 Air Forces Monthly, October 1999.
265 British Arms Export Policy and Indonesia, op cit.
266 Jane's Defence Weekly, 16th July 1997.
267 Flight International, 10th - 16th December 1997.
268 Flight International, 25th February - 3rd March 1998.
269 Jane's Defence Weekly, 5th November 1997.
270 The Star, 16th July 1997.
271 TAPOL bulletin, No. 144, December 1997.
272 Jane's Defence Weekly, 28 May 1997.

ABRI - Indonesian armed forces and police
AEEU - Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union
BAe - British Aerospace
DERA - Defence Evaluation and Research Agency
DTI - Department of Trade and Industry
ECGD - Export Credits Guarantee Department
EU - European Union
FCO - Foreign and Commonwealth Office
GDP - Gross Domestic Product
GOLKAR - the ruling party
IISS - International Institute for Strategic Studies
IMF - International Monetary Fund
IPTN - the Indonesian aircraft manufacturer.
KOPASSUS - a military Special Forces unit
KOSTRAD - the Indonesian Army strategic reserve
NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
OIEL - Open Individual Export Licence
PDI - Christian nationalist Party
RAF - Royal Air Force (UK)
SIEL - Standard Individual Export Licence
TAPOL - the Indonesian Human Rights Campaign
TNI - Armed forces after separation from police
UN - United Nations

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