A pdf copy of the original document may be found at the George Washington University's National Security Archive.

A-570 CONFIDENTIAL
TO     :  DEPARTMENT OF STATE
INFO   :  CANBERRA, MEDAN, SURABAYA, USUN, CINCPAC FOR POLAND


FROM   :  Amembassy DJAKARTA         DATE: May 10, 1968

SUBJECT:  Consular Trip to West Irian, January 6 to February 2, 1968

REF    :

SUMMARY

After several months of dealing with the Indonesian Government, permission
was finally granted for a Consular officer and his wife to make a visit to
West Irian.  This trip began on January 2, 1968 and took them to the Island
of Biak, the Sentani-Sukarnapura area, the interior highlands and the south
coast.  The reporting officer spent three weeks in West Irian, visiting
American missionaries and businessmen in fourteen locations.  During this
period, the reporting officer also had the opportunity to visit government
and missionary installations and meet Indonesian and United Nations
officials.  On the return leg of the trip, the reporting officer also met
with the Australian Administrator in Port Moresby and with officials at
the American Consulate General in Sydney.

The reporting officer found that, while the general economic condition of
the island has improved since previous reports, nonetheless the economy is
stagnant and, with the exceptions of new United Nations projects and some
interest shown by Japanese and American businessmen, no effort is being
made to improve the situation.  The Indonesian Government directs its main
efforts toward maintaining existing facilities and suppressing political
unrest.  This unrest is a product of the widespread separatist movements
which seek independence from Indonesia either through the 1969 "plebiscite"
or through insurrection.  These movements are presently dormant in most
areas, but they may step up guerrilla activities before, during or after

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the actual plebiscite.  It is the opinion of most observers in the area
that Indonesia will not accept independence for West Irian and will not
permit a plebiscite which would reach such an outcome.

The following is a report of the principle highlights of this trip to West
Irian, together with the impressions gained of the political and economic
conditions there.

                            - - - - - - - - -

I.  Preparations for Trip

Planning for this consular trip began in late October 1967 when the
reporting officer initially received instructions on how to apply for
permission to visit West Irian.  The Embassy complied with these instruc-
tions, and on November 16 the Chief of the Consular Section was notified
that an officer of the Army General Staff, Intelligence Section, had
refused to approve the trip and therefore permission was denied.  Written
notification of the decision was requested and received.

The apparent reason for the refusal was suspicion of the motives of all
foreigners seeking entry to West Irian.  Consular files indicated that
more than 250 American missionaries and their families and about 10
Americans employed by Freeport Indonesia, Inc. were in West Irian, all of
whom potentially require consular services.  Because of the number of
persons involved and their basic right to free access to a consular officer,
the Ambassador raised the issue first with Foreign Minister Malik, and then,
at Mr. Malik's suggestion, with Interior Minister Lieutenant General
Basoeki Rachmat who consented to the trip.  The official purposes of the
visit were to meet with Americans, perform any consular services which they
might require, and to observe general conditions in West Irian.
Additionally, a stop at the Freeport site and a ceremonial book presenta-
tion for USIS to Universitas Negeri Tjenderawsih were planned.  By exiting
through Australia, consultations with the Australian Administrator at Port
Moresby and with the American Consulate General in Sydney, which has
handled most consular work for West Irian, were included in the trip.

II.  Physical Characteristics of West Irian

Flying from Djakarta via Makassar to Biak, one crosses first the Bird's
Head (Vogelkop) of West Irian.  The southern portion of this peninsula is
dense jungle and swamp, while the northern portion is hilly and heavily
forested.  Other than the east coast, where scattered small villages are
visible, there are virtually no signs of life.

Biak is a coral island offering little in the way of natural beauty.  While
there are some small, comfortable concrete-brick houses left by the Dutch,
the town of Biak is basically one main street and perhaps 20 side streets,

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V.  Political Situation

A.  The Indonesian Administration

The Indonesian government's presence in West Irian is expressed primarily in
the form of the Army.  The reporting officer met with the Regional Governing
Council (Musjawarah Pimpinan Daerah or MUSPIDA), composed of Governor Kaisiepo,
the Army Commander, Brig. Gen. Bintoro, representatives of the Navy and Police
Commanders and the Chief Prosecutor.  The Governor, who resembles a sun-dazed
frog, made no effort to exert his theoretical leadership.  On the other hand,
General Bintoro made it obvious that he is, in fact, the government of West
Irian.  The police are second in importance, with the others distinctly less
influential.  At this meeting, conducted in Indonesian in deference to the
Governor, the principal subject was the purpose of the reporting officer's
visit; neither of the two government cables advising of this visit had arrived
in Sukarnapura and consequently the local government was taken somewhat by
surprise.  The USIS book presentation for Tjenderawasih University also took
place at this meeting, because Gen. Bintoro is also Rector and evidently did
not wish to have a formal ceremony.

Other than the meeting with the MUSPIDA, the government in Sukarnapura paid
very little attention to the visit and contacts with officials were minimal.
They did provide reasonable accommodations in the new housing complex, a
houseboy from the hotel, and a car and driver borrowed from the UN.  Also,
the central council for all womens' groups in Sukarnapura held a party in
homor of the reporting officer's wife.  In the interior and on the south
coast, the government was far more concerned with the reporting officer's
presence.  In the larger areas, the governmental head, either police or army,
was found to be Indonesian while most subordinates other than army personnel
were recruited from the sophisticated native tribes along the north and west
coast of West Irian.  At smaller posts, the sole government official was
usually an Irianese.

No guard was provided to the reporting officer and no personnel appeared to
be following or monitoring his activities.  While in Sukarnapura, a minimum
of attention was paid to him, and elsewhere he was received as a visiting
dignitary.  This experience is contrary to those of previous diplomatic
visitors and UN personnel when they are outside of Sukarnapura, whose ac-
tivities were closely monitored.  In Biak, a native visiting the missionary
at whose home the reporting officer stayed informed him that no native had
been allowed near any UN official and that the natives had been sent home
prior to a visit by a UN employee to the harbor there.

The government or the army run separate schools in Sukarnapura and elsewhere
for their own employees, that is, for the Indonesians as distinct from the

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local Irianese.  They also have basic Indonesian literary programs through-
out the island, the success of which varies; at least in Sukarnapura and the
town of Biak, Indonesian is the spoken language of almost all persons.  In
the interior and on the south coast only the young children who have at-
tended the three-grade schools can speak the language.  Students at the one
University, Tjenderawasih, are mostly children of government employees.  The
university is also a political indoctrination center for its West Irian stu-
dents and, since Gen. Bintoro recently made himself Rector, the government
must think it a potential source of difficulty for the regime.

In the cultural field, there is a government effort to set up a museum in
Sukarnapura devoted to displaying artifacts of the Papuan cultures.  This
endeavor presently consists of collecting souveniers, without compensation,
from missionaries and other visitors who must go through customs.

The activities of the government, except the schools in the interior and the
general effort to spread the Indonesian language, are largely directed to-
ward preserving the status quo and preventing civil unrest.  Electrification,
communication and transportation are virtually ignored except   to maintain
what few facilities already exist.  Cables from Djakarta usually arrive three
weeks later, delivered by plane.  Telephone service, local and to Djakarta,
is fair, but the only telephone book available was printed in 1963.  Mail
service is impossible.  Electricity is available for only two-thirds of Su-
Karnapura at any given time.  Without MAF radios and planes, no government
communications or transport would be possible to most parts of the island.

There is a large army post in Sentani and a huge mi;itary police camp in
Sukarnapura, but the only civic action efforts seen were related to main-
taining roads.  Army engineers were very efficient in erecting an improvished
bridge after the original washed out in a flash flood.  This efficiency was
probably due to the fact that when the bridge washed out, a caravan of cars
going to Sentani was cut in half; in that caravan were the highest officials
in Sukarnapura plus Indonesia's Police Inspector General Hugeng, who had been
there to install a new police chief for West Irian.

The military is relatively invisible in Sukarnapura, usually staying at their
camps.  The missionaries say that in other towns, particularly Merauke, they
are very visible but exceedingly idle.  In Merauke, it was said, the Military's
only activity is holding ceremonies, which are held on all of the national
holidays and on the 17th of every month.

The military establishments observed consisted of the military police de-
tachment in Sukarnapura, a navy base outside of Sukarnapura and the army camp

15

at Sentani. The MP detachment is comprised of at least 1,000 officers and
men, plus their families and has a large hospital.  The Navy installation is
apparently a left-over from World War II, is almost unoccupied and is in an
advanced state of dilapidation.  The Army camp is located at the site of Gen.
MacArthur's World War II headquarters.  By its size, it appears to house be-
tween two brigades and a division of infantry troops (5,000 or more men).

The only military equipment seen, other than small arms and light trucks,
were an Air Force DC-3 bringing supplies into Wamena, some road-grading
equioment in the Sukarnapura/Sentani and Biak areas, an Army troop transport
in Sukarnapura harbor, and a submarine chaser in Sukarnapura.  The troop
transport had brought in 300 persons, army personnel and their families, for
whom there was no billeting available upon arrival.  They first slept on the
dock and were later moved into cramped bachelor quarters.  The sub-chaser
was purported to have been built in Surabaya, and was armed with a 40-mm
deck gun forward and two depth-charge droppers aft.  It was probably brought
in to prevent smuggling, but is used frequently as a pleasure yacht.

Other military and police installations are scattered throughout the interior
and south.  The police are mainly West Irians, and the Army is there to keep
the police in line and to protect other Indonesians from the police in the
event of trouble.  The missionaries find that Indonesians fear the local
natives and the police recruited in West Irian.  According to the mission-
aries, the pressures from such fears, together with the isolation and un-
usual living conditions, have resulted in a high suicide rate among the In-
donesians assigned to West Irian.

B.  The 1969 "Plebiscite" and Prospects for Violence

The primary political factor in West Irian is the promised "plebiscite" to
determine whether West Irian will become an integral part of Indonesia or
independent.  In this connection, the United Nations recently appointed a
political observer and his team should be in West Irian by mid-1968.  One of
the first questions asked by the missionaries was that Indonesia plans to do,
or more precisely, how they plan to conduct the election; a similar interest
was expressed by the Australiam territorial administrator, Mr. David O. Hay.

The probabl plans of the Indonesian government for 1969, as reported by Mr.
Roeed of FUNDWI, are as follows:  the government will divide West Irian into
a number of areas and select a slate of three to five persons from each area;
a minority of each area's group may be chosen on the basis of local prefer-
ence, but the majority will be Indonesian or Indonesian controlled; the groups
thus constituted will convene as a whole and endorse union with Indonesia.

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A missionary in Jawsikor gave a similar sketch of Indonesian plans and in-
dicated that the selection process there has already began.

All but one Westerner contacted were persistent in the belief that Indonesia
could not win an open election.  The lone exception pointed out that in the
interior and on the south coast the natives are apolitical and primitive in
outlook, with no idea of what an election is, and could easily be induced to
opt for union with Indonesia.  Behind either view is an acceptance of the
antipathy or outright hatred believed to be harored toward Indonesia and
Indonesians by West Irians in the relatively developed and sophisticated
areas.  The open separatist factions are centered in and around the major
coastal towns, such as Sukarnapura, Biak and Manokwari on the North, Sorong
and Fakfak on the West, and Merauke on the South.  It is generally believed
that the separatists will not accept permanent union without a struggle.

The missionaries, UN employees and apparently some of the indigenous sepa-
ratists assume that Indonesia will not give up West Irian willingly, and will
arrange a form of plebiscite which will ensure a "vote" for union.  The sep-
aratists and the Indonesian Government therefore find themselves on a colli-
sion course which makes it immaterial whether Indonesia rigs the outcome of
a plebiscite or wins a popular election by seducing the most backward ele-
ment of West Irian's populace.  Violence is inevitable, if this assessment
is correct.  The questions are when, where and how much violence will occur,
and what its outcome will be.

To some extent, the first two questions have already been answered.  The
long-standing Arfak rebellion in the hills surrounding Manokwari has been
reported previously, as have Indonesia's counter-measures, which early last
year featured B-26 bombing forays and mortar attacks.  While the situation
is still tense, this rebellion apparently has subsided and some of the guer-
rillas are reported to be drifting back to their villages.  Missionaries
estimate that there are between 300 and 1,000 active rebels in the Manokwari
area.

Political arrests of suspected rebels in Biak are an almost daily occurrence,
according to the American missionary there.  Mr. Roeed visited Biak during
the week of January 20 and reported a number of arrests were made the pre-
vious week.  At least one suspected rebel, a prominent citizens named Mr. B.
Mofu, was convicted of unknown crimes and given a fice-year prison sentence.
There are also stories of a raid on a naval armory in Biak last August in
which small arms and machine guns were allegedly capatured.  This story was
repeated by missionaries in Sukarnapura and by Mr. Roeed, but the missionary
in Biak said that the raid was small and disorganized and consequently was
thwarted and all participants captured.  That missionary also told of an

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unsuccessful attempt tp poison the Biak water supply with the result that
the pumping station is now guarded.  It was also in Biak that the reporting
officer personally heard the only derogatory comments made against the Indo-
nesian government by a West Irianese.  The District Chief, a Mr. Jappo, com-
plained that the local government lacked funds for needed equipment.  He
attributed this to the large expenditures being made on an impressive new
mosque in Biak.  Mr. Jappo apparently mentioned the New York activities of
the Papuan Freedom Movement after the reporting officer absented himself
from the room.

Rumors of arrests in other major coastal towns are common among the mission-
aries, though the accuracy of the information is doubtful.  One missionary
in the interior reported that several hundred West Irians had been arrested
in Sukarnapura in late November 1967 for planning a coup d'etat scheduled
for 1968.  Purportedly, the plotters theorized that, by acting this year,
the government would be caught unprepared.  The missionary understood that
a number of DPRD members (representatives to the regional parliament) were
amongst those arrested.  Mr. Roeed denied this and indicated that, although
there had been some arrests in December, a few of them could have been DPRD
members because he attended its last seeion in December and no more than
eight seats were unoccupied.  The army is said to be holding an unknown num-
ber of political prisoners at their Sentani camp.

With the exception of the Manokwari area, there is no open warfare at pre-
sant, but some prophylactic arrests are certainly being made.  The size of
the military estabishment in West Irian (reportedly 10,000 troops) is prob-
ably a deterrent to the separatists and indicates that the government ex-
pects trouble in the future.  Such trouble might come prior to the plebiscite,
un a preemptive effort to expel the Indonesians.  It will certainly come
when the plebiscite is over.

The number of separatists is unknown.  According to most missionaries, vir-
tually the entire population of the developed areas should be counted as
anti-Indonesian, but it is hard to imagine active opposition from more than
25,000 persons; the actual number would probably be much smaller.  The sep-
aratists have no central leadership and no unifying principle other than
independence.  While each area has its local leaders and heroes, the tribes
of each area are divided among themselves and hold deep animosities toward
those of other areas.  As a result, concerted, large-scale warfare seems un-
likely.

The lack of central direction, coupled with the difficult terrain, the lack
of communications and transportation, and a shortage of firearms mean that

CONFIDENTIAL