Chronology Index

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Chronology no. 2 2002-03

Australia and Refugees, 1901–2002 Annotated Chronology Based on Official Sources: Summary

Dr Barry York
Social Policy Group
16 June 2003

Contents

List of Tables

Introduction

The refugee issue remains a matter of parliamentary and public interest in 2003. Events such as the Commonwealth Government's decision to deny permanent residence to East Timorese who were originally admitted on humanitarian grounds in the 1990s, the demonstrations against mandatory detention which occurred outside the new Baxter Immigration Detention Facility at Port Augusta over Easter, and the unanticipated attempts by two boatloads of Vietnamese to reach Australia via Indonesia in late April, testify to the fact that the issue won't go away, despite the success of the Government's multifaceted strategy to deter unauthorised boat arrivals.

This publication is a summary of Australia and Refugees, 19012002: an Annotated Chronology Based on Official Sources. It is intended as a brief overview of the development of Australia's intake and policy responses from 1901 to 2002. It also includes some useful statistical tables. Over 600 000 refugees have been resettled in Australia over the past 50 years. The past has been a reference point in many of the debates, particularly in terms of whether Australia in the new century has maintained its traditional humanitarian response to refugee crises. The central rationale for this chronology is that the past lives on in the present, and policy-makers can only benefit from understanding how things have developed and changed over time.

At a Glance

The century may be summarised into the following six main periods:

Federation to 1945

Immediate post-war period, 19451952

Height of Cold War, 195272

Development of a humanitarian Australian refugee policy and bureaucracy, 19731981

The Institutionalisation of a humanitarian program, 19821991

New challenges, new responses, 19922002

Federation to 1945

Immediate Post-war Period: 19471952

Height of Cold War: 19521972

Development of a Humanitarian Australian Refugee Policy and Bureaucracy, 19731981

The Institutionalisation of a Humanitarian Program, 19821991

New Challenges, New Responses, 19922002

19011991

It comes as a surprise to many that Australia did not have an explicit refugee policy, separate from its general immigration policy, until the late 1970s. Australia certainly received refugees prior to the 1970s but it was in response to the Indo-Chinese refugee crisis of the late 1970s and early 1980s that a comprehensive, ongoing, approach was adopted.

It should be noted that prior to the formation of the League of Nations in 1919 governments around the world were not interested in formulating policy to deal specifically with refugees. Such interest developed through the League and the United Nations, with the usual driving force for refugees being wars and their aftermath rather than the classic 'persecution' criteria set up by the two international bodies. Australia was under no international obligation to take refugees until its ratification of the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and then it still remained free to discriminate on racial grounds in its intake.

White Australia

From the beginning of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, the framers of immigration policy made it clear that Chinese and other 'non-whites' had to be stopped from permanently settling here. They did this chiefly through a 'dictation test', whereby anyone seeking admission could be tested in a European language. Failure of the test automatically imposed 'prohibited immigrant' status on the individual. The test was usually administered at the point of disembarkation and was applied selectively to Chinese and other 'non-whites'. It proved an effective mechanism of exclusion and deterrence.

The White Australia Policy, embedded in the Immigration (Restriction) Act 1901, remained a guiding principle of Australian immigration until its gradual abolition between 1966 and 1973. In such a context, any Australian concern with responsibilities toward refugees was limited in its humanitarianism by the reality of racial exclusion. This point was illustrated by the treatment of Asian evacuees taken in during the Pacific War. More than 6000 were granted protection but as soon as the war was over, the Government took action to repatriate them. About 900 refused to be repatriated and so the War-time Refugees Removal Act 1949 was passed. It mattered not that many had married Australians or established businesses hereand that all had been fleeing the common Japanese militarist enemy during World War Two. In the final analysis it was the colour of skin that mattered.

In addition to racism, Australian refugee policy was framed by decisive factors, such as the need for labour after the Second World War and the politically bipartisan desire to stand firmly against the Soviet Union in the Cold War. The admission of more than 170 000 Displaced Persons from European camps between 1947 and 1954 was followed by large intakes of Hungarians from 1956 to 1958 and Czechs and Slovaks in 1968. Most were anti-Communist, and the Displaced Persons were recruited essentially because they were a convenient source of labour. It was not until 1973 that political refugees from an anti-Communist pro-Western regime would be admitted: the Chileans.

A Refugee Policy

The 1970s mark a watershed in the development of refugee policy for a number of reasons. Firstly, Australia abolished the White Australia Policy in 1973: race was no longer a criterion in immigration selection procedures. The principle was tested soon afterwards, with the Indo-China refugee crisis, following the defeat of United States-backed regimes in Vietnam and Cambodia in 1975. But the 1970s were also notable because Australia no longer required the old type of immigrant. No longer primarily seeking 'factory fodder', Australian governments during the 1970s became more interested in skills-based selection and family reunion. The policy towards refugees continued to be pragmatic but required sharper definition. Thus, on 24 May 1977, the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, the Hon. Michael Mackellar MP, articulated the basic principles, and enunciated a strategy and practical initiatives, for a comprehensive policy. It is worth noting the four key principles, as they have remained a formal basis of policy to the present day:

1. Australia fully recognises its humanitarian commitment and responsibility to admit refugees for resettlement.
2. The decision to accept refugees must always remain with the Government of Australia.
3. Special assistance will often need to be provided for the movement of refugees in designated situations or for their resettlement in Australia.
4. It may not be in the interest of some refugees to settle in Australia. Their interests may be better served by resettlement elsewhere. The Australian Government makes an annual contribution to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which is the main body associated with such resettlement.⁽¹⁾

The above statement is historically significant because it shows that Australia formally recognised that its commitment to refugees must be an ongoing one. Through the development of practical mechanisms for refugee policy implementation, refugees were recognised as a separate component of the wider immigration program, not just another migrant group. In these respects, it may be said that the 1977 Mackellar statement marked the beginning of an explicit refugee policy. Also interesting about the principles is the idea that it may be best for some refugees to be resettled elsewhere.

Indo-Chinese Refugees

Mackellar's landmark statement was made at a time when Australia had to confront the reality of the massive displacement of Vietnamese people. By 1979, there were well over 300 000 Indo-Chinese refugees in camps in South-East Asia.

The establishment by the Australian Government in March 1978 of an inter-departmental Determination of Refugee Status Committee (DORS) was a response to the unauthorised arrival of boats carrying mainly Vietnamese refugees. As a signatory to the United Nations' 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, and to the 1967 Protocol, Australia needed a mechanism for assessing refugee status onshore (i.e. on Australian territory).

The Indo-Chinese refugee issue was resolved through inter-governmental negotiations that culminated in an Orderly Departure Program, based on family reunion and, in 1989, by the adoption of an international approach, endorsed by 51 countries, known as the Comprehensive Plan of Action (CPA). Under the Plan, more than 18 000 Vietnamese were resettled in Australia from transit camps in Indonesia and other places. Those in the camps found not to be genuine refugees were repatriated to Vietnam. The CPA concluded in 1996, with its objective of clearing the camps basically achieved.

Tiananmen Square

The year 1989 was important for other reasons too, as a new set of international events posed challenges to decision-makers and unauthorised boat arrivals became an issue again. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended the Cold War, and altered perceptions, particularly in Europe, of those who had previously been seen as refugees from Communism. Of more immediate importance to Australia, though, was the response of Australia's Prime Minister, Bob Hawke, to the action taken by the Government of the Peoples Republic of China against protestors occupying Tiananmen Square in June 1989. The number of asylum applications in Australia increased by over 10 000: from 1260 in 1989 to 12 130 in 1990 (and to 16 740 in 1991). The applicants were mainly Chinese students already in Australia.

Reform of the Migration Act

In 1989, the Migration Act 1958itself a product of a fundamental overhaul of the Immigration Act 1901was reformed by the Migration Legislation Amendment Act 1989. The 1989 Act established immigration rules and criteria within the legislation with a view to ensuring accountable and consistent decisions. The new regulations, numbering about 200 in all, greatly reduced room for discretion by departmental officers and tightened control of the management of the immigration program. They also created a two-tier system for the review of migration decisions. In these ways, the Act sought to create a fairer processing system and, in doing so, sought to remove the need for unsuccessful onshore visa applicants to appeal to the judiciary.

In the words of the Hon. Robert Ray MP, the Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs in the Hawke Government, the Regulations 'sought to improve the ability to curb abuse of the immigration program by people seeking to come to Australia illegally'. Minister Ray made 'no apology for the toughness of the new law as far as illegal entrants are concerned'.⁽²⁾ The 'toughness' included the introduction of mandatory deportation of 'illegal entrants' and the power to sell their possessions, with a view to recovering costs relating to detention and deportation.

Boat Arrivals and Detention

As mentioned previously, 1989 saw the return of unauthorised boat arrivals in Australia, the first detected since 1981. In November 1989, a small boat carrying 26 people from Cambodia reached Broome, Western Australia, followed by two more boats carrying larger numbers in March and June of 1990. By 31 December 1991, 438 people had arrived in nine boats. The Government responded in the 19911992 Immigration Budget Statement by allocating additional funds for the expansion of staff and facilities related to onshore processing and detention of unauthorised arrivals. It also resolved to establish a new detention centre at Port Hedland in Western Australia. The first group of 'boat people' to be detained at Port Hedland consisted of 104 Indo-Chinese, transferred from Darwin in October 1991.

19922002

A new period in refugee policy, characterised by the detention of unauthorised arrivals in remote centres, had begun. The detention policy would be further developed during the 1990s, beginning with the Migration Reform Act 1992 which made detention mandatory for all unlawful non-citizens (i.e. non-citizens without a valid visa). At the same time, Australia maintained its planned program of refugee and humanitarian intakes at a rate of about 12 000 a year.

The International Environment

In 1992, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated the world refugee population at 17.8 million. In 2001, the estimate was 12 million. Added to the refugees are 'persons of concern' to the UNHCR. In 2001, there were 19.7 million in this category. These are tragically large figures. The UNHCR promotes three durable solutions for the long-term protection needs of such people. The preferred solution is voluntary repatriation in conditions of safety and dignity. If this is not possible, the UNHCR prefers local integration in the country of first asylum. Failing that, the durable solution of last resort, from the UNHCR point of view, is resettlement in a third country. Only nine countries in the world have annual refugee resettlement programs: collectively they resettle around 110 000 each year. (The nine are Australia, Canada, the United States, New Zealand, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark.) The greatest number are resettled by the United States of America.

In the 19922002 decade, Australia admitted more than 100 000 refugees and other humanitarian cases. The largest proportion came from Europe (45 per cent of the total, principally from the regions of the former Yugoslavia), followed by the Middle East and North Africa (25 per cent of the total, principally from Iraq), South-East Asia (13 per cent of the total, principally from Vietnam), Africa (excluding North Africa) (8 per cent of the total, principally from Eritrea and Somalia) and Southern Asia (6 per cent, principally from Afghanistan). About 2 per cent of the total were from South and Central America: a group that was significant to the intake at the start of the decade but whose numbers steadily declined. The region with the biggest rate of increase into Australia under the Humanitarian Program is Africa (excluding North Africa). The African intake has almost doubled during the course of the decade and, while numbers are relatively small (1039 in 20012002), the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, the Hon. Philip Ruddock MP, has indicated a strong interest in this region.

The main international events of relevance to Australia's Humanitarian intake in the period 19922002 relate to the former Yugoslavia and the Middle East. About 70 per cent of Australia's refugee and humanitarian intake originated in these two regions over the decade. Of the Middle East group (27 403 in all), the majority (16 417, or 60 per cent) were from Iraq and were escaping the national socialist regime of Saddam Hussein and the consequences of the 19901991 Gulf War. From 1996, Iraqis became numerically significant among the unauthorised arrivals by boat and, therefore, were prominent in the remote detention centres. The same applied to Afghans from 1997, after the Islamo fascist Taliban took over Kabul in September 1996. These two groups, numbering 21 788 in the Humanitarian Program intake over the decade, had quite an impact outside the planned program. The fact that they, and other groups (such as Sri Lankans, Pakistanis, Iranians and Chinese) tended to arrive via organised people smuggling routes, and as 'forum shoppers' (i.e. they came from countries of first asylum in which they were safe), ultimately led the Australian Government to formulate its Pacific Solution. Under this solution, the islands at which boat people commonly arrived were excised from the Australian migration zone, thus denying unauthorised arrivals any prospect of seeking protection in Australia via Australia's determination system.

Safe Havens and Reintegration Assistance

About 45 per cent of all admissions under the Humanitarian Program came from the regions of the former Yugoslavia, and it is this group that prompted two innovations in Australian policy: the introduction of temporary 'safe haven' protection and the introduction of financial incentives to return home.

War and internal displacement throughout the 1990s were the main causes of the intake. Proclamations of independence from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) by Croatia and Slovenia in June 1991 marked the beginning of the disintegration of the SFRY. The Serb forces of the SFRY retaliated and, in March 1992, when Bosnia and Herzegovina also proclaimed independence, the SFRY laid siege to Sarajevo. The UNHCR began airlifts into Sarajevo on 3 July 1992. The humanitarian air-bridge was in place for more than three years and about 3.5 million people in the former Yugoslavia were helped by UNHCR. During the crisis, the Balkans experienced the worst atrocity in Europe since the Second World War when, in July 1995, 7000 men and boys were massacred by Serb forces at Srebenica, Bosnia. The Dayton Peace Accord, of 21 November 1995, ended hostilities in Bosnia but in March 1998 fighting erupted in the southern province of Kosovo.⁽³⁾ Australia took in 8544 people from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 6517 from Croatia, between 1992 and 2002.

The conflict in Kosovo, between the majority ethnic Albanians and Serbs, resulted in the displacement of about 350 000 ethnic Albanians, many of whom fled the region. In March 1999, North Atlantic Treaty Organization's air war over Kosovo resulted in further displacement, with around 800 000 fleeing. About 90 000 Kosovars were air-lifted by UNHCR and received by 29 countries which offered temporary protection. In April 1999, Australia created 'safe haven' (temporary protection) visas for about 4000. By July, all were temporarily resettled in Australia at various safe haven centres. Not all the Kosovars wished to remain in Australia and many returned as soon as it was safe and practicable to do so. This local experience conforms to the general overseas pattern, with 600 000 displaced persons and refugees returning to Kosovo within three weeks of the SFRY withdrawal of forces in June 1999.

'Operation Safe Haven' was the largest single humanitarian evacuation Australia has undertaken and created two important precedents for the Humanitarian Program in the new century. The first of these was to establish the precedent of offering temporary rather than permanent protection to people in genuine need. It could be said that this precedent really dates to the temporary visas created for Peoples' Republic of China (PRC) students in Australia at the time of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989 but the difference is that the PRC nationals were eventually permitted to remain permanently. Nearly all the Kosovars were in Australia for less than a year. Following from the Kosovar experience, Safe Haven visas were also granted to 1900 East Timorese in September 1999.

The second precedent created by Operation Safe Haven saw the introduction by the government of 'reintegration packages': financial inducements to return home. After the UNHCR declared Kosovo safe in July 1999, many Kosovars returned at the earliest opportunity. But by late August, with the European winter only a month or so away, the Australian Government offered a special 'Winter Reconstruction Allowance' to those who returned before the end of October. It paid $3000 to each adult and $500 per child. The same basic idea was adapted in the case of Afghans under the Pacific Solution in 2002, only it was called a 'Reintegration Package'. By April 2000, nearly all the Kosovars had returned, with only a few hundred by-passing the Allowance. Australia's temporary protection to 4000 Kosovars cost the Government about $100 million over the 12 months of its operation.⁽⁴⁾

Refugee policy after 1992 did not so much mark a political or philosophical break with previous official approaches as a response to the need to deal with changed circumstances. The principles enunciated by the Hon. Michael Mackellar, as Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, in 1977 continued to guide Australian policy, and continued to be shaped by pragmatic considerations. Proof that we did not abandon those principles is found in the continuation of the Humanitarian Program at around 12 000 per year. On a per capita basis, this resettlement program continues to place Australia among the most generous recipients of refugees in the world. The most recent figures from the UNHCR reveal that Australia resettled 42 refugees per 100 000 of its population in 2001, putting it ahead of Canada (33) and the United States (29).⁽⁵⁾

A Managed Program

A defining feature of Australian governmental thinking on refugee policy is the commitment to a planned system. This approach is bipartisan and represents a tradition in the wider migration program. During the 1990s, legislation which aimed at tightening the reception, detention and processing system was motivated by a desire to ensure that the government's intake was not undermined by unplanned (unauthorised) arrivals who may or may not be people in genuine need of protection. This commitment to preserving the integrity of the program continues to have bipartisan support.

Under the Humanitarian Program, the 12 000 admissions a year consist of two main groups. These are refugees within the UN Convention meaning (i.e. they are people outside their country of nationality and unable or unwilling to return because of a well-founded fear of persecution) and people admitted under the Special Humanitarian Program, which was established by the Fraser Government in 1981 for people who are outside their home country and who have experienced gross violations of human rights and cannot return. A Special Assistance Category, established in 1991 to cater for people not in fear of persecution but fleeing civil disorder, has been greatly reduced since 1999.⁽⁶⁾

Mandatory Detention

The period after 1992 differs from the preceding decades in that the Migration Reform Act 1992 formalised in law mandatory detention for all unlawful arrivals. Enacted by the Keating Government, mandatory detention became controversial, especially as the numbers of unlawful arrivals increased over time and as some detainees remained in detention for very lengthy periods (exceeding a year). The Act provided for unlawful arrivals to be detained until such time as an application for asylum had been processed and status finally determined. Appeals before the Refugee Review Tribunal and the Courts extended the duration of detention for those dissatisfied with the primary decision made by the Immigration Department.

Protest groups and refugee advocates condemned the policy of mandatory detention and focused their criticisms on the remote locations and allegedly poor conditions of the centres. The Australian Government was also criticised by international bodies, including the United Nations' High Commissioner for Human Rights and Human Rights' Watch.⁽⁷⁾ Inside the detention facilities, detainees occasionally expressed their frustration through demonstrations and, in late 2001 and 2002, through violent means, including self-harm and the burning down of buildings. By the late 1990s, Minister Ruddock was devoting considerable time to the careful repudiation of what he regarded as misinformation, misconceptions and lack of objectivity on the part of critics.

People Smuggling

Government policy in the 1990s cannot be understood in isolation from the rise in, and sophistication of, international people smuggling.⁽⁸⁾ Government opposition to the practice was not new: indeed, in October 1981, the Fraser Government took firm and prompt action against a group of 146 Vietnamese when it was revealed they had paid substantial amounts for their unauthorised passage to Australia. The passengers were detained at Darwin's East Arm Quarantine Station and deported to Taiwan and Hong Kong.⁽⁹⁾ By the 1990s, people smuggling had become a qualitatively and quantitatively greater force behind the illegal movement of people. Addressing the Forum of Human Rights and Immigration in 1998, Minister Ruddock pointed to the ways in which the problem had grown. He said:

Organisations involved in people traffickingsmuggling them as if they were just so much contrabandare doing very good trade. Their plans are often complex, involving recruitment of passengers, purchase or forgery of travel documents and itineraries which offer transit through several countries before arrival in the eventual destination country. It has been apparent for quite some time now that there are smuggling networks operating throughout China, South-East Asia and Australia to assist illegal immigrants to enter Australia. Increasingly, even boat arrivals in Australia have tended to come from outside the region. Characteristically, these arrivals fly into the region and gather in small groups ready for transhipment by boat on the last leg to Australia. Those who use these smuggling schemes undoubtedly pay heavily for the opportunity. Undoubtedly also, many travellers have been promised by the organisers that they would be allowed to stay in Australia and would quickly be able to work to recoup the cost of travelling.⁽¹⁰⁾

The sophistication of the operations was apparent in the kind of vessels sometimes used to smuggle people. These included 35 metre twin-engine vessels with radar and global satellite navigation, a far cry from the tiny boats used by desperate Vietnamese in the late 1970s.⁽¹¹⁾ Tragic drownings of people travelling on over-crowded boats organised by smugglers heightened the resolve of governments to combat the practice. The Indonesian fishing vessel, code-named SIEV X, which sank on 19 October 2001 is a well-known case in point: 353 of its 397 passengers drowned en route to Australia.

Government concern about people smuggling intensified as a result of a significant increase in unauthorised boat arrivals in 1999 and 2000. Between July 1999 and June 2001, there were 8316 unauthorised boat arrivals compared with 4114 in the ten-year period from 19891990 to 199899.⁽¹²⁾ The increase was accompanied by a change in the regional origin of the arrivalsfrom mostly Asian to mostly Middle Easternand an increase in the percentage applying for protection.

The Government's strategy for dealing with the new circumstances has been based on efforts, such as aid and intelligence sharing, to minimise outflows from countries of origin and of first asylum and on regional and international cooperation to disrupt the smugglers and intercept their clients. Remote detention centres are an additional part of the strategy, along with attempts to quicken both the determination process and the removal of those who are not refugees.

Temporary Protection Visas

A most important legislative amendment in the Government's strategy was the proclamation of the Migration Amendment Regulations (no. 12) on 20 October 1999, which created the three-year Temporary Protection Visa for unauthorised arrivals who are assessed as requiring protection. Previously, such people were granted a permanent protection visa (which is granted to successful applicants onshore who have arrived lawfully, with authorisation). The three-year visa, which limits the range of settlement services available to the holder, has been criticised as unfair to individuals who have been assessed as being genuine refugees.⁽¹³⁾ The Government, however, has argued that such measures are necessary to its multifaceted strategy to combat people smuggling and to deter arrivals from outside of the planned Humanitarian Program. Minister Ruddock has consistently argued that, given the limits to Australia's capacity, every unauthorised arrival who is granted protection takes the place of one of the many who have been languishing for years in refugee camps in Asia, the Middle East and Africa. Critics reject the 'queue-jumping' accusation but no-one disputes the fact that the UNHCR has thousands of people in refugee camps who have been assessed as genuine refugees in need of resettlement and who have been waiting for a resettlement place for many years.

Border Protection and the 'Pacific Solution'

The controversies of the early 1990s came to a head in the late 1990s and early 2000s with an exponential increase in the number of unauthorised arrivals into Australia by sea. In July 1999 the Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 1999 was passed to create people smuggling and related offences. In November, the Border Protection Legislation Amendment Act 1999 was passed to expand Australia's capacity to board, search and detain ships and to detain persons aboard those ships at sea. In February 2000 the Crimes at Sea Act 2000 was passed to extend the criminal jurisdiction of the Commonwealth and States to the limits recognised under the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. These measures were tested with the arrival of the MV Tampa off Christmas Island on 29 August 2001 and the adoption by the Federal Government of the so-called 'Pacific Solution'. The Tampa, a Norwegian freighter, had rescued 430 passengers aboard the KM Palapa 1, a fishing vessel that had broken down 80 nautical miles from Christmas Island:

The master of the Tampa, Captain Arne Rinnan, had intended to take the rescuees to a port in Indonesia but was requested by the passengers to proceed to Christmas Island. Before the Tampa reached Australia's territorial waters it was instructed to remain in the contiguous zone. On 28 August the Tampa issued a distress signal based on the fact that assistance had not been provided within 48 hours. On 29 August it proceeded into the territorial waters surrounding Christmas Island and was interdicted by [the SAS]. The same day the Government introduced border protection legislation into Parliament. ⁽¹⁴⁾

The Border Protection Bill 2001 sought to retrospectively validate the actions in relation to the Tampa and, effectively, to deny its passengers the right to claim asylum in Australia. It was rejected by the Senate against the backdrop of legal action in the Federal Court and Full Federal Court challenging the lawfulness of the action in relation to the rescuees.

The key provisions were subsequently re-introduced along with various other measures. In the last sitting period for 2001, Parliament considered and passed a number of Bills dealing with the validation and enforcement of border protection measures, the 'excision' of offshore territories from the migration zones, a new protection, humanitarian and refugee visa regime, partially codified refugee assessment criteria, mandatory sentencing for people smugglers and a privative clause relating to judicial review of migration decisions.

On 26 September, the second last sitting day of 2001, the Senate passed six Acts:

Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001

Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001

Migration Legislation Amendment (Judicial Review) Act 2001

Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 1) 2001

Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No. 6) 2001

Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001

Some of this legislation had been previously introduced and failed to pass the Senate. Many of them set the legislative framework for an administrative arrangement that came to be known as the 'Pacific Solution'. The Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 excised certain territories from Australia's migration zone, including Christmas Island, Ashmore and Cartier Islands and Cocos (Keeling) Islands, with a view to creating a separate visa application regime for unlawful arrivals at the excised places. Unauthorised arrivals to those territories cannot apply for a visa. The Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 allowed for the detention of an unlawful non-citizen in an excised offshore place, for the transfer of an unlawful non-citizen from Australia to another country, and prevents such people from taking legal action against the Government in an Australian court. Under the Pacific Solution, asylum seekers were housed and processed at Manus Island (Papua New Guinea) and Nauru, at Australian Government expense. Through these measures, the Government hoped to further deter unlawful arrivals and also to reduce the high levels of litigation in the Courts.

By the end of 2002, the Australian Government had weathered the storm of protest and criticism and Minister Ruddock could accurately report, on 17 December, that there had not been an unauthorised boat arrival for twelve months. At the time of writing, May 2003, the Government's multifaceted strategybased on prevention of outflows from countries of origin and first asylum, cooperation with other countries to disrupt people smugglers, mandatory detention and the introduction of temporary protection for genuine cases who arrive without authorisation, and the Pacific Solutionappears to have achieved its objectives.

Endnotes

1.       Hon. Michael Mackellar, Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Statement, House of Representatives, 24 May 1977, p. 1714.

2.       Senator the Hon. Robert Ray, Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs, Media Release, MPS 88/89, 18 December 1989.

3.       UNHCR, A brief history of the Balkans,
http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home/+UwwBmeLtOGswwwwrwwwwwwwhFqnN0bItFqnDni5AFqnN0bIcFqrxwcAwD5Dzmxwwwwwww/opendoc.pdf,
accessed on 6 May 2003.

4.       P. Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Media Release, MPS 028/2000, 15 March 2000.

5.       Figures for 2001 resettlement are for quotas which appear in the UNHCR's Easy Guide to Refugee Resettlement Programs, Geneva, 15 June 2001.

6.       Only 40 visas were issued under the Special Assistance Category in 20012002.

7.       Human Rights Watch issued a 94 page report, By invitation only: Australian asylum policy, in December 2002.

8.       People smuggling is defined by the United Nations' Global Program Against Trafficking in Human Beings as 'the procurement of illegal entry of a person into a State of which that person is not a national with the objective of making a profit'.

9.       Department of Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, Review '82, AGPS, Canberra, p. 63.

10.   P. Ruddock, 'The plight of Australia's illegal immigrants', Address to the Forum of Human Rights and Immigration, Sydney, 14 May 1998.

11.   Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, Media Release, MPS 59/99, 11 April 1999.

12.   Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs, Border protection: Background paper on unauthorised arrivals strategy, http://www.minister.immi.gov.au/media_releases/media01/r01131_bgpaper.htm
last updated 22 July 2002, accessed on 6 May 2003.

13.   J. Jupp, From White Australia to Woomera, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 2002, pp. 190193.

14. N. Hancock, 'Refugee LawRecent Developments', Current Issues Brief No. 5, Department of the Parliamentary Library, 200102, pp. 12, http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/CIB/2001-02/02cib05.htm, accessed on 6 May 2003.

Table 1: Humanitarian Arrivals (Assisted), Financial Years 194748 to 197475

Note:

Between January 1947 and 195253, all were Displaced Persons. The Scheme was discontinued in 1952. An estimated additional 33 000 humanitarian cases were not assisted by government.

Sources: Compiled from Australian Immigration: Consolidated Statistics, Nos 1, 1966, 4, 1970, Department of Immigration, AGPS, 1966 and 1970, and No. 13, 1982.

Table 2: Humanitarian Arrivals, Financial Years 194748 to 199091

Notes:

(a) Special Humanitarian Program (introduced late in 1981)
(b) Includes an estimated 170 000 displaced persons who arrived between 1947 and 1954.

Source: DIMA (unpublished tabulations)

Table 3: Humanitarian Arrivals, Financial Years 199192 to 200001

Note:

Table 4: Humanitarian Program by Country of Birth, 19911992 to 20012002

Source: DIMIA

Table 5: Estimated Global Refugee Population and 'Persons of Concern' to the UNHCR, 19782002(a)

Notes:

(a) All figures are for year ending 31 December.
(b) This category was not enumerated by UNHCR prior to 1993.

Source: UNHCR website: Statistics page and UNHCR, The State of the world's refugees, 19971998, Oxford University Press, 1997, p. 54. Totals do not include other groups (i.e. other than refugees by the UNHCR definition) of concern to the UNHCR and Palestinians assisted by the UN Relief and Works Agency.

Table 6: Ministers of Immigration, Ministries and gross annual settler intake, 19451991(a)

Notes:

(a) All figures are for the financial year ending 30 June.

(b) Ministers indicated are those holding office for the majority of the year. (During the period of the 'caretaker' Government of Malcolm Fraser in November and December 1975, the Minister for Labour and Immigration was Anthony Street).

(c) The settler intake includes permanent and long-term arrivals before 19581959.

(d) The 1947 figure includes arrivals from October 1945.

(e) The Department of Immigration was amalgamated with Labour between 1974 and 1976.

Table 7: Onshore Asylum Applications 19892002

Source: Immigration Department Annual Reports.

Table 8: Unauthorised Arrivals by Air and Sea, 198990 to 200102

Source: DIMIA Fact Sheet No. 74, Unauthorised arrivals by air and sea, DIMIA web-site, last update: 27 November 2002.

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